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Interconnection agreements in the telecommunications industry have always been constrained by 
regulation.  Internet interconnection has not received the same level of scrutiny.  Recent debates 
regarding proposed mergers, network neutrality, Internet peering, and last mile competition have 
generated much discussion about whether Internet interconnection regulation is warranted.  In 
order to determine whether such regulation is necessary, policymakers need appropriate metrics 
to help gauge a network provider’s market power.  Since Internet interconnection agreements are 
typically not published publicly, policymakers must instead rely on proxy metrics and inferred 
interconnection relationships.  Alessio D’Ignazio and Emanuele Giovannetti have attempted to 
address this challenge by proposing a standard set of metrics that are based on and assessed using 
network topology data.  They suggest two metrics, referred to as customer cone and betweenness, 
as proxies for market size and market power.  This thesis focuses on the efficacy of the proposed 
customer cone and betweenness metrics as proxies for network market size and market power.   
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Interconnection agreements in the telecommunications industry have always been constrained by 
regulation due to the assumption that the telecommunications industry is a natural monopoly.  
Internet interconnection has not received the same level of scrutiny.  Recent debates regarding 
proposed mergers, network neutrality, Internet peering, and last mile competition have generated 
much discussion about whether Internet interconnection regulation is warranted.  Regulatory 
intervention typically occurs when policymakers are trying to remediate various types of market 
failures.  Given the tendency toward natural monopoly in the telecommunications industry, 
intervention in Internet interconnection would likely be justified by concerns about network 
provider market power and its associated use.  In order to determine whether such regulation is 
necessary, policymakers need appropriate metrics to help gauge a network provider’s market 
power.   
 
Ideally, policymakers would have access to Internet interconnection agreements.  They could then 
generate an Internet interconnection graph that would illustrate where traffic exchanges occur and 
the associated financial conditions.  This graph could be augmented with IP address ownership 
data that would show the geographic scope and end user coverage of each network.  This 
augmented graph would enable policymakers to map the number of network providers serving 
end users in a geography, the options for accessing a network’s end users, and the centrality of a 
network provider when accessing the rest of the Internet.  This visibility would help determine the 
existence and extent of each network provider’s market power.  Policymakers could also ascertain 
whether network providers are engaging in predatory pricing, constructing barriers to entry, or 
demonstrating other anti-competitive behavior.  However, Internet interconnection agreements 
are typically not published publicly.  Policymakers must instead rely on proxy metrics and 
inferred interconnection relationships.   
 
This thesis analyzes the efficacy of using the proposed customer cone and betweenness metrics to 
assess network market size and market power.  A policymaker might use the customer cone 
metric to determine the relevant market and then calculate the betweenness for each network 
provider in that market.  Both of these proposed metrics are generated from network topology 
data.  This thesis explores the challenges of relying on network topology data to develop such 
metrics.  The customer cone analysis focuses on the complexity of inferring interconnection 
relationships from BGP data.  Since the customer cone is used to determine a network’s role in 
the Internet hierarchy, inaccurate assumptions about interconnection agreements could result in a 
network’s relevant market being incorrectly defined.  The thesis then examines two aspects of 
betweenness.  The first aspect is the challenge of relying on a market power metric derived from 
routing data due to the growth of overlay networks.  The second aspect is the relevance of 
betweenness to access networks given that betweenness is defined in terms of the access between 
networks rather than between networks and end users. 
 
1.1 Network Provider Market Power Metrics 
In 1997, Worldcom acquired MCI through a stock tender offer valued at $37 billion.  Prior to 
approving the transaction, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated the merger due to its 
potential impact on the Internet backbone industry.  This investigation highlighted the challenges 
of estimating the market size and market power of Internet network providers.  As Constance 
Robinson, the Director of Operations and Merger Enforcement at the time, noted in a speech in 
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1999, “[d]etermining market shares was challenging because there was no commonly accepted 
method and there were legitimate questions about the accuracy of each method (Robinson, 1999, 
p. 10).”  The Department of Justice used various measures of market share.  These included the 
share of overall Internet industry revenues generated by ISPs that connected through various 
Internet providers and the percentage of ISPs connected to a specific backbone versus the total 
number of ISPs connected to all of the backbones combined.  Since they were unsure of the 
accuracy of these metrics, they also examined market share using the following:  
 
Internet traffic originating, terminating, or otherwise traversing an Internet backbone’s 
network (a measurement of size and significance of a backbone relative to other 
competitors); a revised revenue share that attempted to eliminate the double counting and 
irrelevant revenues; the number and type of Internet Points of Presence (“POPs”) on a 
backbone’s network; the number of circuits connecting customers to a backbone (which 
would correct for differences in customer size/significance);the number of “routes 
advertised” (or terminating IP addresses)—the density of a provider’s network and web 
of customers, and finally the number, type, and significance of each network’s customers 
(Robinson, 1999, 11). 
 
While each metric resulted in different absolute numbers, all of them indicated that the combined 
MCI/Worldcom entity would be a dominant player in the market.   
 
This investigation illustrates the on-going challenge of assessing the market size and market 
power of Internet network providers.  Although the MCI/Worldcom investigation occurred in the 
late 1990s, there are still no standard metrics used to assess network providers.  The concerns 
about the accuracy of available metrics also persist.  Part of the challenge is the continuing lack of 
data on interconnection agreements.  Since interconnection agreements are typically subject to 
non-disclosure agreements, there is minimal data available regarding the terms of these 
agreements.   
 
Several initiatives have attempted to infer the actual bilateral business relationships by using 
network topology data (Gao, 2001; Subramanian et al, 2002; Huber et al, 2004).  The assumption 
is that it is possible to determine the existence and nature of a relationship based on the exchange 
of routing advertisements.  While these initiatives have expanded public knowledge of 
interconnection relationships, the challenge of establishing standard metrics remains.   
 
Alessio D’Ignazio and Emanuele Giovannetti have attempted to address this challenge by 
proposing a standard set of metrics that are based on and assessed using network topology data.  
They suggest two metrics, referred to as customer cone and betweenness, as proxies for market 
size and market power.  In order to assess the applicability of these metrics, D’Ignazio and 
Giovannetti calculate betweenness and customer cone for a set of network providers.  Since the 
interconnection agreements are not publicly available, they rely on methodologies that use BGP 
data to infer the relationship between each pair of network providers.  They then examine the 
correlation between the metrics and the inferred interconnection agreements. 
1.2 Assessing Betweenness 
This thesis focuses on the efficacy of the proposed customer cone and betweenness metrics as 
proxies for network market size and market power.  Section 2 provides historical background on 
Internet interconnection regulation and practices.  It also presents the assumptions that are often 
made about a network provider’s role in the Internet hierarchy and associated market power based 
on its interconnection agreements.  Section 3 describes the proposed betweenness and customer 
cone metrics as defined by D’Ignazio and Giovannetti.  It explores the challenges of relying on 
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BGP data to both generate the metrics and to infer the interconnection agreements.  This is 
especially critical as the inferred interconnection agreements impact the conclusions regarding a 
network’s relevant market and the relationship of betweenness to market power.  Section 4 
discusses the potential impact of overlay networks, such as CDNs, on betweenness while Section 
5 provides empirical data illustrating the effect.  Section 6 then focuses on the relevance of 
betweenness as a metric for assessing access network market power.  Recently, concerns about 
network market power have shifted from the backbone providers to the access networks or the 
ISPs that provide Internet connectivity to end users.  While the inherent challenges of relying on 
metrics derived from BGP apply to all networks, a modified definition of betweenness could 
apply to backbone providers.  In contrast, access networks may require a new metric since 
betweenness is by definition about the access between networks.  Section 7 suggests an 
alternative metric for access networks that would consider two factors: access variance, a new 
parameter that is proposed in this thesis, and market relevance.  Section 8 concludes the thesis 
and provides some additional recommendations for enhancing the betweenness metric.   
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2. Historical Background 
2.1 Interconnection Regulation 
Government regulation of telecommunications interconnection dates back to the early twentieth 
century.  The justification for such intervention is the monopolistic tendencies of the unregulated 
industry.  Telecommunications is considered a “network” industry as the value of a 
telecommunications network to each user increases with the number of other users of the 
network.  Due to these network effects, the telecommunications provider with the greatest 
number of subscribers can slowly establish a monopoly.  The monopoly provider can then use 
their position to coerce smaller companies.  For example, at the beginning of the 1900s, the Bell 
System provided telephone services for most major population centers and owned the only long 
distance network in the United States.  AT&T, which owned the Bell System, refused to 
interconnect with smaller local carriers unless they joined the Bell network.  Without access to 
the long distance lines, local carriers found it very difficult to convince customers to join their 
network.   
 
As a result of AT&T’s coercion of the smaller local carriers, the Justice Department’s anti-trust 
authorities began investigating AT&T’s activities.  In 1913, AT&T resolved the dispute by 
entering into the Kingsbury Commitment.  As part of this agreement, AT&T agreed to 
interconnect with local telephone companies for long distance calls.  These interconnection 
requirements were formalized in §201(a) of the 1934 Communications Act: 
It shall be the duty of every common carrier … to furnish such communication 
service…in cases where the Commission…finds such action necessary or desirable in the 
public interest, to establish physical connections with other carriers, to establish through 
routes and charges applicable thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to establish 
and provide facilities and regulations for operating through such routes. 
The requirements were further codified in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  As §251(a) of 
the Telecommunications Act states, “[e]ach telecommunications carrier has the duty … to 
interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications 
carriers (United States Congress, 1996).”  Regulators recognized that mandating that carriers 
interconnect might not be sufficient to prevent discrimination.  Although a monopoly provider 
might interconnect with smaller carriers, the monopoly provider could limit the capacity allocated 
for these providers or provide different service quality levels.  As a precaution, §251(c) further 
clarified that interconnection must be “at least equal in quality to that provided by the local 
exchange carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other party to which the carrier 
provides interconnection (United States Congress, 1996).” 
 
Unlike the public switched telephone network, the Internet has never been subject to 
interconnection regulation.  The absence of such regulation is partially an artifact of the Federal 
Communication Commission’s distinction between computer and telecommunications providers.  
In the 1960s, the growth of mainframe computing led the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) to consider the convergence of computer and telecommunications technologies.  The FCC 
was unsure of whether computers and data processing services should be regulated under Title II 
of the Communications Act of 1934, the regulatory scheme that applied to telecommunications 
providers.  The FCC was also concerned that “some … regulated communications companies 
were wandering off and entering into the unregulated data processing markets (Cannon, 2003, p. 
173).”  In 1966, the FCC launched the first of three Computer inquiries.  In Computer I, the FCC 
proposed the separation of “pure communications” from “pure data processing:”   
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Pure communications exist where the content of the message is transmitted over the 
network transparently with no change in content or form of the message.  Pure data 
processing is the processing that takes place at the end of the telephone line (Cannon, 
2003, p. 174).   
The FCC viewed the data processing market as an innovative, competitive market and determined 
it did not require regulatory intervention or safeguards.  Thus, data processing services would not 
be subject to Title II.  The pure communications market was provisioned by the incumbent 
telephone provider who was typically a monopolist.  Since telephone companies could serve as 
“both supplier and competitor to the data processing services (Cannon, 203, p. 177),” the FCC 
was concerned that the telephone companies might engage in anti-competitive behavior:   
[W]e were concerned about the possibility that common carriers might favor their own 
data processing activities by discriminatory services, cross subsidization, improper 
pricing of common carrier services, and related anticompetitive practices and activities 
which could result in burdening or impairing the carrier’s provision of its other regulated 
services (FCC, 1971). 
The FCC did not intend to bar carriers from provisioning data processing services.  However, 
they concluded that regulated communication carriers could only offer data processing services 
through a separate entity.  This safeguard was referred to as “maximum separation.” 
 
The Computer I classifications proved unsustainable, especially once “[d]umb remote terminals 
[gave] way to smart microcomputers or minicomputers (Cannon, 2003, p. 182).”  These 
technological developments made it “harder to distinguish communications from data processing 
or computing (FCC, 2005, p. 15).”  As a result, the FCC initiated Computer II in 1976.  In 
Computer II, the FCC distinguished between computers that facilitate communication and 
computers with which users interact.  This distinction was captured in the definitions of basic 
service and enhanced service.  Basic service is the “transmission capacity in the physical network 
for the movement of information (Cannon, 2003, p. 183).”  Enhanced service employs “computer 
processing application that act on … the subscriber’s transmitted information; provide the 
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involved subscriber interaction 
with stored information (Cannon, 2003, p. 186).”  The transition from Computer I to Computer II 
transformed the analysis from “an examination of the technology to an examination of the service 
provisioned (Cannon, 2003, p. 186).”  In 1985, the FCC launched Computer III as it believed that 
the existing separate subsidiary regulations were too cumbersome.  Although Computer III 
relaxed the structural separation requirements, the distinction between basic and enhanced service 
remained. 
 
When Congress revamped the Communications Act in 1996, it codified basic service and 
enhanced service as telecommunications services and information services.  The FCC adheres to 
these definitions today.  “Telecommunications services” continue to be governed by Title II of 
the Communications Act, while “information services” are regulated by Title I of the Act.  Since 
“common carriage” obligations only apply to those services subject to Title II, 
“telecommunications services” must provide each customer with “the same opportunity as any 
other similarly situated customer to buy the same service on the same terms Neuchterlein and 
Weiser, 2005, p. 50).”  “Information services” are not required to comply with these obligations. 
 
In 2000, the FCC initiated a proceeding to apply these classifications to cable companies that 
were offering broadband Internet access to customers.  The FCC concluded that cable companies 
should be classified as “information services” since cable companies merely use 
telecommunications to provide end users with cable modem service (FCC, 2002).  In June 2005, 
the United States Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s classification in its National Cable & 
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Telecommunications Association v. Brand X decision (Supreme Court of the United States, 2005).  
Common carrier obligations now varied depending on the technology being used to provide 
broadband Internet access service.  In order to address this discrepancy, the FCC adopted its 
Wireline Broadband Order in August 2005.  In the Order, the FCC classified all wireline 
broadband Internet access service as “information services (FCC, 2005).”  As a result of these 
decisions, broadband Internet access providers are now exempt from mandatory common-carrier 
regulation.  They are no longer under any legal obligation to fulfill the interconnection 
requirements detailed in §251.   
 
This exemption has fed the growing concern that network operators will leverage their control of 
the physical layer to discriminate against certain uses of the Internet.  For example, in August 
2008, the FCC found that Comcast’s blocking of the BitTorrent file sharing application did not 
fall within a provider’s allowable network management practices (FCC, 2008).  This “network 
neutrality” debate has focused on the potential for harmful discrimination against the 
applications, content, and services that run over the network (Wu, 2004; Van Schewick, 2007).  
However, there is also the potential that network operators will establish discriminatory 
interconnection practices.  For example, a network operator might refuse to peer with another 
network operator or set unattainable peering requirements.  Network operators might also include 
service quality levels in their interconnection agreements, effectively prioritizing traffic from 
select network operators.  These concerns have generated discussion as to whether the 
government should regulate Internet interconnection.  In order to assess the need for government 
intervention, it is necessary to understand current Internet interconnection practices.     
 
2.2 The Origins of Internet Interconnection 
The need for interconnection is a result of the Internet’s initial architecture and its evolution from 
military to commercial use.  The origins of the Internet can be traced to the ARPANET, a 
network developed in the late 1960s with funding from the Advanced Research Projects 
Administration (ARPA) of the Department of Defense (DoD) (Abbate, 1999).  The intent was to 
develop a resilient communications infrastructure that could survive an attack.  Since DoD funds 
could not be used to support non-DoD use, ARPANET access was limited to ARPA contractors.  
In order to expand network access, researchers at universities without ARPA contracts proposed 
that the National Science Foundation (NSF) fund a new network.  The NSF funded this project in 
1981, setting the precedent for opening the network beyond ARPA’s contractors.  In 1983, the 
Department of Defense split the ARPANET into MILNET (for military use) and ARPANET (for 
civilian research), making it even easier to connect civilian researchers to the Internet.  This split, 
the introduction of personal computers, and advancements in local area networking led to rapid 
growth in the number of networks connected to the Internet.  Universities and businesses began 
building local area networks and, when possible, attaching these networks to the ARPANET.  
Each network was managed by an independent entity and could have its own technical design.  In 
order to connect to the APRANET, the network only needed to run the same underlying protocol, 
TCP/IP, and set up a gateway with the ARPANET. 
 
In the mid 1980s, the NSF began planning its own nationwide high-speed network.  From its 
conception, the NSFNET was designed as a network of networks rather than a single network.  In 
the NSFNET, regional networks would be connected to a central network or “backbone” network.  
In 1987, the NSF awarded a five year contract to the Michigan Educational Research Information 
Triad network (MERIT) to build and operate an updated backbone.  In an attempt to coordinate 
activities between ARPA and NSF, the agencies agreed that the NSFNET would leverage the 
ARPANET backbone while the NSFNET backbone was being built.  This arrangement opened 
the Internet to nearly all universities in the United States, dramatically increasing the number of 
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Internet users.  By the late 1980s, the ARPANET had become obsolete and the decision was 
made to have the NSFNET become the Internet backbone.   
 
The transfer of the Internet from ARPA to NSF marked the end of military control.  However, the 
Internet was still run by a government agency and intended for nonprofit research.  NSF believed 
that the only politically acceptable way to accommodate commercial users would be to privatize 
the Internet.  The growth of the NSFNET had led to the creation of commercial network service 
providers, many of which were spin-offs of the NSF regional networks.  Since the NSFNET 
backbone could not carry commercial traffic, these service providers began expanding their 
operations to cover the continental United States.  However, these service providers still needed 
to rely on the Internet backbone for interconnection.  Since the Internet backbone continued to be 
closed for commercial use, service providers explored alternatives for interconnection.  In July 
1991, three service providers, PSINet, CERFNet, and Alternet, created the Commercial Internet 
Exchange (CIX).  Exchange members financed the operation of the exchange through a 
membership fee and agreed to accept traffic from any other member free of charge.  Other 
commercial networks soon joined CIX. 
 
Due to the success of commercial network services, the NSF concluded that it could transition 
ownership of the Internet infrastructure to the private sector.  As part of the transition, the NSF 
formulated a new architecture in which “regional networks [would] connect to [Network Service 
Providers] for interregional (national) connectivity and connection to interexchange points called 
Network Access Points (NAPs) (Gaston, 1995).”  Similar to CIX, the NAPs enabled network 
providers to connect their networks according to bilateral agreements.  These agreements had 
historically assumed the free exchange of traffic.  As discussed in the next section, privatization 
led networks to establish agreements that would more accurately reflect the costs and benefits 
accrued by each network.  The NSF officially decommissioned the NSFNET in April 1995, 
ending US government ownership of the Internet infrastructure. 
 
2.3 Current View of Internet Interconnection 
The Internet is still a network of networks.  For example, a 2010 visualization of Internet 
topology prepared by CAIDA involved more than 26,000 networks and 85,000 peering sessions 
(CAIDA, 2011).  In order to provide end-to-end Internet access, these networks still need to 
establish interconnection agreements with other networks.  With the privatization of the Internet, 
many of the agreements that had previously assumed a free exchange of traffic transitioned to 
paid relationships.  The traditional view of interconnection assumes that networks establish either 
peering or transit relationships (Norton, 1999; Norton, 2001).  In a peering relationship, networks 
of similar size exchange traffic on behalf of their customers.  Since the relationship is mutually 
beneficial, such agreements are typically settlement-free.  In order to ensure that each network 
receives similar benefits, networks may need to meet pre-defined requirements in order to be 
eligible for peering.  For example, a network might need to maintain a certain traffic exchange 
ratio, geographical presence, or backbone capacity (AT&T, 2011; Verizon, 2012).  In a transit 
relationship, a smaller network pays a larger network for access to the rest of the Internet.  The 
actual execution of these relationships typically occurs at exchanges, such as the NAPs 
established by the NSF, or via dedicated links paid for by the involved networks.   
 
The networks composing the Internet are assumed to be interconnected in a hierarchical fashion.  
Since backbone providers are usually the only networks that can fulfill each other’s peering 
prerequisites, backbone providers peer with each other.  Smaller networks then purchase 
upstream bandwidth from either the backbones or larger ISPs.  For example, in its past 
examinations of Internet interconnection (Kende, 2000; Werbach, 1997), the FCC identified four 
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categories of Internet participants: end users, content providers, Internet service providers (ISPs), 
and backbone providers.1  End users and content providers obtain Internet access through ISPs, 
such as AOL, Verizon, and Comcast.  The ISPs in turn connect to backbone providers, such as 
AT&T, Level3, and Qwest.  These backbone providers own or lease national or international 
high-speed networks, carry traffic to and from ISPs, and interconnect with other backbone 
providers.   
 
These conceptual models of the Internet simplify the actual structure.  Rather than a strict 
bifurcation between peering and transit, interconnection agreements span a continuum between 
these two categories (Faratin et al, 2007).  For example, under partial transit, a network sells 
access to a subset of its Internet prefixes.  With paid peering, networks exchange traffic as they 
would in a peering relationship, but the exchange is no longer settlement-free.  The networks are 
also not arranged in a strict hierarchy.  The growth of peer-to-peer traffic has increased the 
prevalence of peering among ISPs.  By peering directly with each other, the ISPs can reduce the 
amount of traffic that they need to send via their transit providers.  Finally, the scope of 
interconnection has expanded beyond backbone providers and ISPs.  Although overlay networks, 
such as content delivery networks, do not own fiber, they establish peering and transit 
relationships with network providers.  Overlay networks deploy their servers at exchange points 
and within ISP datacenters.  Since overlay networks often serve content to users from servers 
deployed within the users’ ISPs, the ISPs no longer needs to send as much traffic through their 
transit providers.  Large content providers, such as Google and Yahoo!, are also able to negotiate 
peering and transit agreements with backbone providers due to the volume of requests they 
receive from end users.   
 
2.4 Interconnection and Market Power 
Interconnection agreements reflect the bargaining power of a network provider.  Policymakers 
have relied on interconnection practices to both define the relevant market and to assess a 
network’s market power.  For example, it has been assumed that networks that achieve global 
connectivity through peering reside at the top of the Internet hierarchy.  These networks possess 
greater market power in the top-level Internet connectivity market as other providers must 
purchase transit from these backbone networks.  When evaluating a proposed merger between 
backbone providers, policymakers define the market as those networks that only have settlement-
free peering agreements.  A network’s role in the Internet hierarchy - and therefore its relevant 
market - is determined by its relationships with other providers.   
 
Policymakers must also assess a network’s market power within the defined market.  If 
policymakers had access to detailed interconnection agreements, they could analyze the economic 
arrangements between network providers and determine whether a provider was engaged in anti-
competitive practices.  However, interconnection agreements tend to be confidential, so 
policymakers must rely on proxy metrics.  These proxy metrics are often based on inferred 
interconnection agreements.  There are many challenges in developing these proxy metrics due to 
the reliance on BGP data when generating the metrics and the growing complexity of 
interconnection agreements.  Section 3 describes two such metrics, customer cone and 
betweenness, which are intended to serve as proxies for network market size and market power.  
The section provides the technical background required for understanding how these metrics are 
generated and validated.  It then outlines the challenges of relying on BGP data to infer 
interconnection agreements and therefore the difficulty in using the resulting metrics to determine 
                                                   
1
 Werbach identifies three entities: end users, Internet service providers, and backbone providers.  These are 
the categories used by Kende. 
17 
the relevant market.  Sections 4 and 5 illustrate the impact of the increasing complexity of 
interconnection, particularly the introduction of overlay networks, on the relevance of proxy 
metrics derived from BGP data.   
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3. D’Iganzio’s and Giovannetti’s Proposed Metrics 
 
Recognizing the difficulty in characterizing a network’s market share and market power, Alessio 
D’Ignazio and Emanuele Giovannetti proposed a set of metrics based on interconnection 
relationships inferred from network topology data.  They developed these metrics, referred to as 
customer cone and betweenness, to serve as proxies for market share and market power.  They 
then applied these metrics to several current regulatory challenges: 1) assessing the level of 
concentration in the European Internet upstream access market and 2) determining the impact of 
asymmetry between network providers on their interconnection agreements.   
 
In order to evaluate D’Iganzio’s and Giovanetti’s proposed metrics, it is important to understand 
how network topology data is used to infer interconnection relationships and the implications of 
these relationships for assessing a network’s market power.  This section provides some 
background on Internet routing and the algorithms used to infer relationships from routing data.  
It then describes how D’Iganzio and Giovannetti applied these approaches to generate their 
customer cone and betweenness metrics.  The section concludes by describing the inherent 
challenges in relying on BGP data to develop such metrics. 
 
3.1 Internet Routing 
A network, commonly referred to as an autonomous system (AS), is a collection of routers and 
links managed by a single institution.  An AS may be owned by a corporate enterprise, a 
university, a commercial Internet Service Provider (ISP), or an Internet backbone provider.  In 
order to route traffic both within their own network and to external destinations, ASes run 
intradomain and interdomain routing protocols on their routers (Teixeira and Rexford, 2006).  
The intradomain routing protocol, Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), governs the routing of traffic 
within an AS.  The interdomain routing protocol, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), manages the 
exchange of information about destinations that belong to other ASes.  When a packet is sent to a 
destination, BGP determines which ASes have to be traversed in order to reach the destination.   
 
Destinations are identified by a 32-bit address, such as 192.168.1.1, referred to as an IP address.2  
Due to the number of destinations and IP addresses, ISPs perform prefix-based routing.  With 
prefix-based routing, ISPs only use the first part of the IP address to determine the next hop or 
destination for the packet.  Since a prefix represents a range of IP addresses, ISPs can advertise a 
prefix rather than individual IP addresses.  This reduces the amount of information that needs to 
be exchanged.  In order to exchange routing information, an ISP’s border routers establish BGP 
sessions with the border routers of neighboring ASes.  These routers exchange BGP update 
messages so that each AS has the most recent routing information.  In situations in which a 
network has BGP sessions with multiple neighboring ASes, the network may receive multiple 
routes for a destination prefix.  The network uses these route advertisements to build its routing 
table.  When a router receives a packet, it performs a lookup on the destination IP address to 
determine where the packet should be sent next.  Figure 1 shows a sample routing table from an 
end user’s computer.  In this example, the table only lists the gateways to which the computer is 
directly connected rather than the entire path the packets take through the Internet.  This 
illustrates one of the challenges of BGP as a router does not have visibility into the packet’s entire 
path.  As a result, the router cannot incorporate end-to-end performance into its routing decisions.  
If there are performance or availability problems, BGP converges on a new path very slowly as it 
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 ISPs are in the process of transitioning from Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) to Internet Protocol version 
6 (IPv6).  While IPv4 uses a 32-bit address space, IPv6 uses a 128-bit address space. 
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Figure 1. Sample routing table 
  
A BGP route has several attributes that are conveyed in the route advertisement.3  An AS can 
manipulate these attributes to apply local policies for selecting and propagating routes for each 
destination prefix.  These policies reflect the AS’s business relationships and allow the AS to 
achieve network-wide objectives such as traffic engineering, scalability and security.  For 
example, an ISP might prepend multiple copies of its AS number to the AS path to artificially 
inflate the AS-path length.  The AS-path is the sequence of ASes that a packet will travel across 
from a source to a destination.  Since the ISP’s AS path appears longer than other paths to a 
destination, packets will be sent along an alternative route thereby reducing the AS’s transit 
traffic.  Other objectives might include balancing link load and limiting propagation delays.  
When selecting a route, BGP considers the ordered list of attributes and selects the “best” route 
for each destination path from the routes learned from its neighbors.  In the absence of local 
policies, BGP chooses the route with the absolute minimum path length.   
 
When an ISP agrees to a peering or transit relationship, they modify their BGP routing tables 
accordingly.  The routing tables are therefore the technical mechanism through which an ISP 
implements its interconnection agreements.  Since interconnection agreements are not publicly 
available but BGP data is accessible, some researchers have proposed using BGP data to 
determine interconnection relationships.  In the following section, we discuss several research 
initiatives that have inferred AS relationships based on BGP data and have validated their 
findings with external sources. 
 
3.2 Inferring Interconnection Relationships 
Since interconnection focuses on the exchange of traffic between ASes, several research 
initiatives have attempted to infer relationships based on BGP data.  These relationships are then 
used to estimate an AS’s role or importance in the Internet hierarchy.  As noted previously, 
policymakers consider an AS’s role in the Internet hierarchy when determining the relevant 
market and when assessing an AS’s market power within that defined market.  There are several 
methods for inferring relationships from BGP data.  Traceroute-based methods observe the actual 
path taken by packets by sending active data into the network.  The output of a traceroute 
provides information on the networks that a packet passes through as well as the travel time on 
each network.  An alternative method is to look at the BGP routes advertised by ISPs.  The 
Internet Routing Registry (IRR) was created to act as a repository of these BGP routes.  However, 
                                                   
3
 These attributes include the Local Preference (LocalPref), the lowest AS path length, and the Multi-Exit 
Discriminator (MED). 
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many ISPs are unwilling to reveal their routing policies so the IRR information is often 
incomplete.  Instead, researchers rely on BGP data made available through projects such as 
RouteViews.  Researchers have performed extensive work in this area, but the two most 
prominent efforts are that of Lixin Gao and Lakshminarayanan Subramanian.  Beatrice Huber et 
al compared Gao’s, Subramanian’s and several other approaches for inferring AS relationships 
and suggested some additional considerations. 
 
Lixin Gao classifies the relationships between a pair of interconnected ASes into customer-to-
provider, peer-to-peer, and sibling-to-sibling relationships (Gao, 2001).  A customer-to-provider 
relationship reflects a transit agreement in which a customer pays a provider for access to the rest 
of the Internet.  In a peer-to-peer relationship, the two ASes have agreed to a peering relationship 
and exchange traffic at no cost.  A sibling-to-sibling relationship exists if the two ASes belong to 
the same administrative domain or their domains have a mutual transit agreement.   
 
Gao then outlines the impact of each relationship on a network’s BGP export policies.  When 
exporting routes to either a peer or a provider, a network should only export its routes and the 
routes of its customers.  This policy prevents the network from having to pay for traffic being sent 
to one of its providers.  For example, if AS 6 were to export the routes of AS 3 to AS 4, AS 4 
might send traffic destined to AS 3 through AS 6.  Since AS 6 has a customer-to-provider 
relationship with AS 3, AS 6 would need to pay AS 3 for that traffic.  When exporting routes to a 
customer or a sibling, a network should export its routes, the routes of its customers, and routes 
learned from peers or providers.  Since a customer is paying the provider for access to the rest of 
Internet, the providing network should export all of its routes.  Gao proves that by following these 
export policies, an AS can ensure that the AS path of a routing table entry is valley-free.  This 
valley-free property means that “after traversing a provider-to-customer or peer-to-peer edge, the 
AS path cannot traverse a customer-to-provider or peer-to-peer edge (Gao, 2001).”  Gao tested 
the algorithms on the BGP routing tables made available by the University of Oregon 
RouteViews server.  Gao verified the results with AT&T’s internal information which confirmed 
99% of the inferred customer relationships and 76% of the inferred peering relationships (Gao, 
2001). 
 
Subramanian et al extended Gao’s work to address several practical challenges of inferring 
commercial relationships between ASes (Subramanian et al, 2002).  For example, as 
demonstrated by AT&T’s analysis of Gao’s results, peer-to-peer relationships are difficult to 
classify.  Gao determined that a peer-to-peer relationship can only exist between a top provider 
and one of its neighboring ASes in an AS path.  A top provider is the last AS in either a maximal 
uphill or downhill path.  Since a peer-to-peer relationship is typically between ASes of similar 
sizes, Gao uses the degree of each AS as a proxy for the AS size.  The degree represents the 
number of other ASes with which an AS has a relationship.  Gao therefore identifies peer-to-peer 
relationships by considering the degree of ASes adjacent to the top provider in the path.  ASes 
with similar degrees are of similar size and are therefore peers, such as AS 1 and AS 2 in Figure 




Figure 2.  AS degrees and relationships 
 
Subramanian et al used data from multiple vantage points as relationships are not always visible 
from every view.  If a relationship between ASes is not visible in many partial views, 
Subramaniam inferred peering relationships using a probability measure.  Since this approach 
combines multiple viewpoints, it can tolerate occasional exceptions to Gao’s export rules.  
Subramanian et al then analyzed the Internet hierarchy and proposed a five-level classification of 
ISPs: customers, small regional ISPs, dense core, transit core, and outer core.  The position of an 
AS in the Internet hierarchy is based on the derived commercial relationships rather than simply 
the AS degree of connectivity.  Subramanian et al applied their inference techniques and ISP 
classification to ten BGP routing tables from Telnet Looking Glass servers.  They found that the 
dense core ASes are very well connected, while inter-level and intra-level connectivity drops 
significantly when moving from dense core to customers.  Their findings are consistent with the 
generally accepted view of the hierarchical structure of the Internet. 
 
Beatrice Huber et al compared several mechanisms for inferring AS relationships: Gao’s 
algorithm, Subramanian’s approach, information available in the Internet Routing Registries, and 
a simplified Robban tool.4  They concluded that all of the approaches had drawbacks, but focused 
on the challenges with applying Gao’s valley-free path algorithm.  They ran several variants of 
the algorithm using different metrics to estimate the importance of an AS.  In addition to Gao’s 
degree metric, they considered the size of the IP address space announced by an AS, the number 
of important Web sites having an IP address belonging to an AS, and the number of end users 
associated with an AS.  Since varying the weighting associated with each metric led to a different 
ranking of the ASes, they concluded that “the complexity of peering decisions cannot be mirrored 
by one general definition of importance” and that “no single measure can capture the diversity of 
factors influencing business decisions (Huber et al, 2004).”   
 
These research efforts demonstrate the complexity of inferring interconnection agreements from 
network topology data.  Despite the challenges, many researchers, including D’Iganzaio and 
                                                   
4
 The simplified Robban tool infers the type of relationship between ASes by only looking at the last two 
ASes of a path and only considering paths consisting of at least three ASes.  The last AS of the path is 
assumed to be a customer of the next to last AS.  The occurrences of every pair are counted and are only 
considered relevant if they are seen at least three times.  A relationship is determined to be peering if there 
are pairs where AS A provides transit for AS B and AS B provides transit for AS A as well. 
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Giovannetti, rely on these methods due to the lack of publicly available data and the critical role 
that understanding these relationships plays in assessing network market size and market power.   
 
3.3 Customer Cone and Betweenness 
D’Iganzio and Giovannetti leveraged these algorithms for inferring interconnection relationships 
to generate and validate their customer cone and betweenness metrics.  They applied these 
metrics in two markets to assess their usability in assessing network market share and market 
power. 
 
D’Ignazio and Giovannetti proposed the customer cone as a proxy for market share.  The 
customer cone concept was originally introduced by CAIDA.  By applying Gao’s and 
Subramanian’s relationship inference algorithms to publicly available BGP data, CAIDA 
developed an AS-level graph of the Internet (CAIDA, 2010).  CAIDA then defined the customer 
cone at three different level of precision: the number of ASes, prefixes, or /24 address blocks 
contained in all of the customers of a provider.  CAIDA developed an AS ranking based on these 
customer cones.  ASes with larger customer cones, and therefore higher AS ranks, are assumed to 
have a larger role in the Internet capital and governance structure.   D’Iganzio and Giovanneti 
used CAIDA’s most precise customer cone definition in their analysis.  Since the customer cone 
represents the portion of the Internet reachable through that provider, they suggested that the 
difference between two providers’ customer cones provides a “market share-focused measure of 
asymmetry (D’Ignazio and Giovannetti, 2006, p. 19).”   
 
 
Figure 3.  Example customer cone 
 
Betweenness represented a network’s degree of unavoidability or network centrality.  The 
betweenness metric is the sum of the number of shortest BGP paths between two networks on 
which the selected network lies.  D’Ignazio and Giovannetti view betweenness as expressing “the 
market power of any given player, by showing how unavoidable a given operator is in the 
Internet traffic flows given the set of existing Interconnection parties (D’Ignazio and Giovannetti, 
2006, p. 20).”  A high betweenness score indicates that “[an] AS has a certain degree of market 
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power over the others, since it may be costly to avoid the central ASes and follow other paths in 
order to deliver packets over the Internet (D’Ignazio and Giovannetti, 2005).”  This metric 
captures the economic concept of a partially essential facility. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Sample betweenness calculation 
 
D’Ignazio and Giovannetti utilized their customer cone and betweenness metrics in two analyses.  
In “Antitrust Analysis for the Internet Upstream Market: a BGP Approach,” they provided an 
approach for defining the relevant market and assessing market concentration in the European 
Internet upstream access market.  They obtained the lists of ISPs for each Internet Exchange Point 
(IXP) participating at the Trade Association Euro-IX and calculated two Herfindakl-Hirschman 
Index of concentrations (HHI) for each ISP and each IXP.  The first HHI calculation used the 
customer cone from CAIDA.  The market share for each AS was the ratio of its customer cone to 
the sum of all customer cones of the Internet Exchange members.  The second HHI calculation 
used betweenness in place of customer cone.  They concluded that “[t]here is no sensible 
comparison between the market share calculated by the CAIDA rank and the one calculated using 
the betweenness data” and that the customer cone metric was a better proxy for market share 
(D’Ignazio and Giovannetti, 2005, p. 17).  They noted that the lack of correlation between the two 
HHIs was indicative of the complexity of capturing the concentration in the market.  As part of 
this analysis, they introduced a vertical market classification algorithm.  They used the CAIDA 
AS rank to separate the ASes belonging to each exchange into four vertically separated classes: 
Tier 1, Core (Inner Core, Outer Core), Transit (Regional Transit, Local Transit, and Campus 
Level) and ISP customers.  They assumed that the ASes within a class are “considered equally 
relevant in terms of network transport capacity and economic bargaining power (D’Ignazio and 
Giovannetti, 2005, p. 15);” all of the networks within a class are in the same market.  They then 
added a geographic market boundary defined by the IXPs that are independently able to supply 
universal connectivity.  They selected four major European Internet Exchange Points (LINX, 
DECIX, MIX, and AMSIX) since they were considered independent geographic markets 
allowing universal connectivity to their members.  They calculated the customer cone and 
betweenness HHIs for each vertical class at each exchange.5  Once again, there was a divergence 
between the two HHIs and they noted that the differences require further research.  While 
                                                   
5
 In this analysis, D’Ignazio and Giovannetti used five vertical classes (Tier 1, Inner Core, Outer Core, 
Transit, and ISP customers) rather than the original four vertical classes. 
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betweenness might not be a useful metric for assessing market share, they did state that 
“concentration in [betweenness] could express the pivotal role of some ISPs that, while not 
having a particularly large customer base, still represents an almost non-avoidable essential 
facility in the Upstream Internet Routing (D’Ignazio and Giovannetti, 2005, p. 28).”   
 
In “’Unfair’ Discrimination in two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINX,” D’Ignazio and 
Giovannetti examined the impact of network asymmetry on interconnection agreements.  They 
classified the members of the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX) into Tier-1 providers, 
Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs) and Internet Services Providers (ISPs) based on their 
estimated customer cones.  They focused their analysis on the ISPs and calculated the difference 
in customer cone and betweenness for each pair of ISPs.  They also modeled the geographic 
differentiation of the ISPs using two variables.  The first variable was the distance between the 
headquarters of the networks, while the second variable considered the difference between the 
networks’ number of Internet Exchange Points memberships.  A final variable focused on the 
number of exchange points at which both providers were present.  This variable was included to 
capture the hot potato routing effect.6  D’Ignazio and Giovannetti then performed an econometric 
analysis of the interconnection relationships of the ISPs.  Using the algorithms developed by Gao, 
Subramanian et al, and Huber et al, they inferred the interconnection relationships between the 
providers.  They then examined the correlation between the difference in the metrics and the 
establishment of a peering relationship.  They concluded that while asymmetry in “market size” 
(customer cone) facilitates peering, asymmetry in “network centrality” (betweenness) makes 
peering less likely and hence interconnection “unfairer.”   
 
3.4 Challenges of Relying on Network Topology Data 
The reliance on BGP data impacts the effectiveness of using customer cone and betweenness as 
proxies for market share and market power.  The customer cone is intended to capture the market 
share of a network provider within its relevant market.  A provider’s relevant market is 
determined by its AS rank which is based on its inferred interconnection relationships.  However, 
a network’s routing policies reflect motivations in addition to the economic arrangements 
specified in their interconnection agreements.   
 
Advertised routes do not always accurately reflect the terms and motivation behind an agreement.  
Network operators have multiple motivations driving their BGP routing policy decisions (Caesar 
and Rexford, 2005).  As categorized by Matthew Caesar and Jennifer Rexford, these motivations 
include traffic engineering, scalability, and security.  For example, networks often alter their 
advertised routes in order to control traffic volumes and limit congestion.  This traffic engineering 
enables them to meet peering requirements such as contractual traffic ratios.  It also allows them 
to achieve performance commitments which may be codified in service level agreements.  In 
other cases, ASes may appear to be peers based on their size and the routing information they 
exchange.  However, even though a network operator might meet another operator’s peering 
criteria, they may opt to pay for transit to ensure high quality service.   
 
ISPs also modify their route advertisements due to scalability concerns.  Many ISPs aggregate 
prefixes and announce hundreds of prefixes under the same AS path to limit the number of 
routing changes.  This increases the scalability of the routing tables, which are inherently size 
constrained, but it also prevents ISPs from “flapping.”  “Flap damping” is used in order to reduce 
routing instability.  A penalty value is associated with each route and is incremented whenever an 
                                                   
6
 Hot potato routing refers to the practice of handing off traffic to another AS as quickly as possible.  The 
AS that receives the traffic therefore bears the majority of the cost of carrying the traffic to its destination. 
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update is received.  When the penalty exceeds a certain threshold, the route is suppressed for a 
period of time.  By aggregating prefixes, an ISP can limit its routing updates and reduce the 
likelihood of “flap damping”.  If an ISP adds a new customer but has already been advertising 
that subnet, the ISP may opt to not make any changes to its routing advertisements.  The BGP 
routing data would therefore not indicate that a new interconnection agreement had been 
established.  
 
Finally, many ISPs implement mechanisms to minimize their vulnerability to false information in 
BGP updates.  In order to protect itself against attacks, an ISP may perform import filtering to 
discard invalid routes or install blackhole routes to drop malicious traffic.  An ISP may also want 
to limit the influence of neighboring ASes over its routing decisions.  The ISP might delete 
attributes or overwrite them with the expected values to protect against neighboring ASes’ 
attempting to violate peering agreements.  All of these motivations might result in publicized 
routes that are never taken in practice.   
 
Due to these often conflicting motivations, there is typically no direct mapping between a 
network’s routing policy and its underlying motivation.  If a metric, such as the customer cone, is 
based on incorrect inferences regarding interconnection agreements, a network provider’s 
relevant market may be inappropriately defined.  This can result in inaccurate assumptions about 
a network provider’s market power as policymakers might only consider the betweenness of the 
networks in that specified market.  Betweenness calculations are further complicated by their 
reliance on BGP since traffic might not follow the BGP-dictated path.  Under D’Iganzio’s and 
Giovannetti’s definition of betweenness, a network is defined as unavoidable based on the BGP 
shortest path.  The shortest path definition does not account for the availability of alternative 
options or the actual traffic flow.  If the shortest path were disrupted, the Internet would not 
partition but traffic would instead be diverted through alternative paths.  This divergence between 
the routes expressed via BGP and the actual traffic flow is largely due to the growth in Internet 
intermediaries such as overlay networks.  Section 4 explores the role of overlay networks in 
influencing traffic flows and the resulting impact on betweenness.    
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4. Overlay Networks 
 
The introduction of overlay networks has further complicated the accuracy of metrics based on 
network topology data.  Since overlay networks route traffic at the application layer, the paths 
advertised through BGP are not necessarily indicative of the traffic flow.  This can significantly 
impact the relevance of metrics, such as betweenness, that rely on BGP data as a proxy for traffic 
flow.  Overlays such as content delivery networks are designed to optimize performance and 
route around Internet issues.  Since the BGP data is unaltered when an overlay selects an alternate 
route, a betweenness metric based only on BGP may not accurately reflect the unavoidability of a 
network. 
 
This section provides some technical background on content delivery networks and then discusses 
the theoretical impact of a content delivery network on a network provider’s betweenness.   
4.1 Content Delivery Networks 
As noted previously, the scope of interconnection has expanded to included overlay networks.  
Overlays “exist between that which is provided by ISPs as part of our global communication 
infrastructure and the applications that ride on top of the infrastructure (Clark et al, 2005).”  
There are various types of overlay networks, including content delivery networks, peer-to-peer 
networks, and anonymous communication systems.  While overlays vary in their objectives and 
architectural designs, all of them route traffic for their own purposes rather than attempting to 
reflect the underlying ISPs’ interconnection agreements (Keralapura et al, 2004; Seetharaman and 
Ammar, 2006; Xie et al, 2007).  Since overlay networks direct requests to alternative source 
locations, the network relationships expressed through BGP may not be representative of how 
traffic actually flows in the Internet.  Overlay networks therefore impact the usefulness of metrics 
which are based on advertised BGP routes.   
 
Many content delivery networks (CDNs) do not own the network infrastructure, but operate 
virtual networks consisting of servers deployed within ISPs.7  However, they are still considered 
autonomous systems and establish peering and transit relationships.  Similar to other ASes, CDNs 
advertise their IP blocks through BGP.  They also introduce an additional layer of intelligent 
routing by dynamically selecting the server that will respond to an end user’s request.  An end 
user’s request is mapped to the appropriate server through DNS interposition or HTTP redirects 
that result in URL rewriting.  While BGP determines the AS path between the end user and the 
selected CDN server, the DNS resolution determines the specific server with which the end user 
interacts.  For example, the Akamai network consists of 84,000 servers deployed in nearly 1,000 
ISPs (Akamai, n.d.).  In order to use Akamai’s delivery services, a Web site, such as 
www.foo.com, creates a DNS alias or CNAME record pointing to an Akamai domain.  When an 
end user requests www.foo.com, the Web site’s DNS servers return the CNAME record.  This 
CNAME sends the request to Akamai’s DNS servers for resolution.  Akamai’s DNS servers 
return the IP address of the Akamai server selected by its mapping algorithms.  BGP then routes 
the exchange of packets between the end user and the server.  Since Akamai controls which IP 
address is returned, it can route traffic to optimize end user performance and manage its own 
costs.     
 
                                                   
7
 In recent years, network providers have developed or acquired their own content delivery networks.  
Providers who have developed these networks organically typically differ from standalone content delivery 
networks in that the providers’ networks only include servers deployed within their own network. 
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Figure 5.  DNS Request Flow for Akamaized Content 
 
This intelligent routing of requests by CDNs can impact an ISP’s interconnection agreements 
with other ISPs.  Unlike traditional peering relationships in which networks agree to exchange 
traffic, there is a different value proposition for networks that agree to peer with CDNs such as 
Akamai.  Since Akamai caches and serves content close to the end user, it decreases the amount 
of upstream bandwidth required by the ISP.  The ISP can therefore reduce their upstream 
bandwidth costs or maintain traffic ratios that could make them newly eligible for peering 
relationships.  However, as the CDN is unaware of the ISP’s other interconnection agreements 
and routes traffic based on its own objectives, the CDN can override the ISP’s traffic 
management policies (Keralapura et al, 2004).  An ISP may be unable to maintain contractual 
traffic ratios or may miscalculate upstream bandwidth requirements.  In both instances, the result 
is that interconnection agreements may change more frequently than previously assumed.  
Therefore, interconnection relationships inferred from outdated data may misrepresent the current 
state of interconnection.   
 
4.2 Content Delivery Networks and Betweenness 
In addition to influencing an ISP’s transit requirements and peering eligibility, CDNs can also 
impact a network’s betweenness.  A network’s betweenness is based on the number of shortest 
paths on which it lies.  In D’Iganzio’s and Giovannetti’s analysis, the shortest path is defined by 
the advertised BGP routes, rather than the actual traffic flow.  Since BGP has no concept of 
quality of service, the shortest path has the minimal number of AS hops, but does not necessarily 
have the fastest end-to-end delivery time.  CDNs incorporate end-to-end delivery time into their 
routing decisions.  As a result, the IP address that is returned by the CDN does not always 
correspond to the server that would result in the least number of AS hops.  Also, since CDNs are 
continuously monitoring changing Internet conditions, they can route requests to alternate servers 
if a network is overloaded, a cable is cut, or networks have depeered.  CDN routing effectively 
overrides ISP routing so the advertised BGP routes are not always indicative of traffic flows.   
 
Since BGP routes do not necessarily reflect the actual packet flow, a betweenness metric based on 
BGP will not accurately convey a network’s unavoidability.  A network may reside on the 
shortest path as defined by BGP, but that does not mean that packets flow along that path and that 
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there is no alternative if the network is unavailable.  Figure 6 illustrates how a network’s 
betweenness metric would be impacted if traffic flow were taken into account.  If www.foo.com 
and www.foobar.com were not using Akamai, end user requests would follow AS paths 1-2-3 and 
1-2-4 respectively.  If www.foo.com and www.foobar.com were using Akamai, AS 3 and AS 4 
would continue to advertise the IP addresses for www.foo.com and www.foobar.com.  However, 
the end user requests and the content response would rarely pass through ASes 2, 3, and 4, but 
would instead follow AS path 1-5-6.  In this example, a network’s betweenness differs 
dramatically depending on whether it is calculated using only BGP shortest path or traffic flow.   
 
 





BGP Shortest Path Traffic Flow 
1 2 2 
2 2 0 
3 1 0 
4 1 0 
5 0 2 
6 0 2 
 
The following section provides empirical data illustrating the potential impact of a content 
delivery network on a network provider’s betweenness. 
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5. An Empirical Analysis of Content Delivery Networks and Betweenness 
 
This analysis examines the impact of overlay networks on betweenness by comparing the BGP 
shortest path with the traffic flow for three of the most popular Web sites.  Many Web sites use 
CDNs to deliver their images while continuing to serve their HTML from their origin servers.  
This bifurcation allows the Web sites to offload the bandwidth-intensive content, thereby 
reducing their origin bandwidth and improving Web site performance.  By comparing the AS 
paths for origin HTML content and CDN image content, it is possible to gauge the impact of a 
CDN on a network’s betweenness and traffic volume.  This analysis assumes that if a Web site 
were not using a CDN for image delivery, the images would be hosted on the same network as 
the HTML, even if the images and HTML were maintained on different servers.   
 
The Web sites used in the analysis were selected by reviewing the top trafficked Web sites and 
identifying those sites using a CDN only for image delivery in at least one location.  A Web site’s 
use of CDN services may vary depending on the geography.  For example, a Web site may only 
use a CDN for image delivery in the U.S., but may opt for both image and HTML delivery in 
geographies where they have experienced performance or availability issues.  The top trafficked 
Web sites were selected based on their Alexa (http://www.alexa.com/topsites ) and Compete 
(www.compete.com) traffic rankings.  By checking the DNS records of the HTML domain and 
the image domain(s), it is possible to determine whether a site is using a CDN only for image 
delivery.  In order for a company to be eligible for the analysis, their HTML domain must resolve 
to an IP address owned by the company while the image domain must be CNAMEd to a CDN 
provider.  The sites were selected based on these domains: 
 
Company Origin HTML Domain CDN Image Domain 
eBay www.ebay.com pics.ebaystatic.com 
Facebook www.facebook.com static.ak.fbcdn.com 
MySpace www.myspace.com js.myspacecdn.com 
 
These sites also include content from other domains.  In the following sections, there is a list of 
the domains and their classification as either non-CDN (delivered from the origin server) or CDN 
(served by a CDN) for each site. 
 
Traceroutes were run each day between the above domains and four international locations 
provided by just-traceroute (just-traceroute.com).  This analysis used the just-traceroute locations 
in France (217.70.191.252), Japan (203.83.244.101), Singapore (203.142.24.254), and the United 
States (208.84.149.44) due to their geographic diversity.   
 
5.1 eBay Analysis 
eBay’s images are served by Akamai while its HTML is served from its origin server for the 
France, Japan, Singapore, and U.S. just-traceroute agents.  Figure 7 shows the ASes that origin 
HTML requests traverse as compared with Akamai image requests.  Due to the location of the 
optimal Akamai server for the just-traceroute agents, eBay’s use of Akamai reduces the 
betweenness of Deutsche Telecom, Level 3, and AboveNet while increasing the betweenness of 




Figure 7.  eBay Betweenness Analysis 
 
The following chart illustrates Akamai’s impact on betweenness assuming each just-traceroute 
agent requests one HTML page and one image: 
 
eBay Betweenness Analysis 
Autonomous 
System 
Without Akamai (HTML Delivery) With Akamai (Image Delivery) 
Betweenness Path Betweenness Path 
AboveNet 1 Gandi  AboveNet  Level 3 0 - 
Bouygues 
Telecom 0 - 1 
Gandi  Bouygues 
Telecom 
Deutsche 
Telecom 1 JMF  IIJ  Deutsche Telecom 0 - 
Gandi 1 Gandi  AboveNet  Level 3 1 Gandi  Bouygues Telecom 
IIJ 1 JMF  IIJ  Deutsche Telecom 1 JMF  IIJ 
Infinitum 
Technologies 1 Infinitum  Level 3 1 Infinitum  TW Telecom 
JMF 1 JMF  IIJ  Deutsche Telecom 1 JMF  IIJ 
Level3 3 
Gandi  AboveNet  Level 3 
Infinitum  Level 3 
Webvisions  Starhub  Level 
3 
0 - 
Starhub 1 Webvisions  Starhub  Level 3 1 
Webvisions  Starhub  
Telekom Malaysia 
Telekom 
Malaysia 0 - 1 
Webvisions  Starhub  
Telekom Malaysia 
TW Telecom 0 - 1 Infinitum  TW Telecom 
Webvisions 1 Webvisions  Starhub  Level 3 1 
Webvisions  Starhub  
Telekom Malaysia 
 
The actual impact on each network’s betweenness depends on the volume of image traffic that 
would otherwise traverse their network.  This impact can be approximated by estimating the 
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average weight of the HTML page and the embedded images per request and multiplying that by 
the monthly page views.  By accounting for the regional distribution of the Web site’s end users 
and the image cache hit rate, the traffic estimate can be further refined.   
 
A typical eBay home page and product page includes content from www.ebay.com, 
pics.ebaystatic.com, other eBay-owned domains, and third party domains such as ad networks.  In 
order to estimate the average amount of non-CDN and CDN content on the home page and 






pn1.adserver.yahoo.com 3rd party 
promo.ebay.com eBay 
thumbs.ebaystatic.com eBay 
pn1.bc.yahoo.com 3rd party 
rover.ebay.com eBay 
www.dwg10.com 3rd party 
cgi.ebay.com eBay 
www.moreshoresandhandbags.com 3rd party 
i14.ebayimg.com eBay 










img-cdn.mediaplex.com 3rd party 
vi.ebaydesc.com eBay 
uac.advertising.com 3rd party 












The home page and product page bytes were then categorized as non-CDN or CDN assets 
depending on the domain.  For example, the average overall home page size was 365,845 bytes of 
which 86,641 bytes were non-CDN assets and 279,204 bytes were CDN assets.  Multiplying the 
non-CDN and CDN bytes by the Web site’s monthly page views provides an estimate of the 
monthly GBs transferred.  Since networks have historically measured traffic and established 
interconnection agreements based on bits per second (bps), the monthly GBs transferred is 
translated to Gbps.  As described by Akamai, the 95/5 measurement excludes the top 5% of 
monthly traffic: “95/5: The billing and measurement methodology shorthand describing a process 
of determining the 95th percentile of usage or the uncompressed equivalent as measured by 
Akamai over five minute intervals (Akamai, 2012).”  A Web site may have a huge spike in traffic 
that would significantly increase its bytes transferred, but if the elapsed time was less than 36 
hours per month, the spike would not impact the site’s 95/5.  As a result, there is no standard 
conversion between bytes transferred and bits per second although it is usually assumed to be 












Estimated eBay Traffic 
Assets 











CDN 86,641 18,494 193,523 106,846 172,147 2,242,910 11.2-14.0 
CDN 279,204 15,410 175,878 105,080 196,543 2,560,775 12.8-16.0 
1The average bytes per page view assumes an average page weight equivalent to 20% of requests being for 
the home page, while the remaining 80% of requests being for product pages. 
2The monthly GBs transferred assumes 13,989,864,979 page views based on Compete’s December 2009 
page view numbers. 
3Lower range assumes 200,000 MBs transferred equals 1 Mbps measured at 95/5 while upper range 
assumes 160,000 MBs transferred equals 1 Mbps measured at 95/5. 
 
Since eBay’s end users are not evenly distributed throughout the world, the overall traffic was 
multiplied by the estimated country percentage for the just-traceroute agent countries.  This per 
country traffic estimate is later used in Section 8.3.2 to assess Akamai’s impact on a network’s 
unavoidability within a country.   
 
eBay Country Traffic 
Country % of Site Traffic1 
95/5 Gbps 95/5 Gbps with 95% cache hit rate 
Non-CDN Assets CDN Assets Non-CDN Assets CDN Assets 
United States 69.2% 7.8-9.1 8.9-11.1 8.2-10.3 8.4-10.5 
Japan not available2 0.9-1.1 1.0-1.3 0.9-1.2 1.0-1.2 
France not available 0.9-1.1 1.0-1.3 0.9-1.2 1.0-1.2 
Singapore not available 0.9-1.1 1.0-1.3 0.9-1.2 1.0-1.2 
1% of site traffic by country based on Alexa data. 
2All countries whose % of site traffic is “not available” accounted for less than 0.8% of eBay’s traffic.  The 
95/5 Gbps estimates are calculated assuming that these countries had 0.8% of eBay’s traffic, the maximum 
possible amount. 
 
5.2 Facebook Analysis 
Facebook’s images are delivered by Akamai, while the HTML is served by Facebook’s origin 
server.  However, there is an exception as it appears that Facebook’s HTML content is served by 
Akamai within Japan.  Facebook’s use of Akamai reduces the betweenness of EP.net, Level 3, 
LINX, and Neotelecoms while increasing the betweenness of Bouygues Telecom, Telekom 




Figure 8.  Facebook Betweenness Analysis 
 
The following chart illustrates Akamai’s impact on betweenness assuming each just-traceroute 
agent requests one HTML page and one image: 
 
Facebook Betweenness Analysis 
Autonomous 
System 
Without Akamai  
(HTML Delivery excluding Japan)1 
With Akamai 
 (Image Delivery and Japan HTML Delivery) 
Betweenness Path Betweenness Path 
Bouygues 
Telecom 0 - 1 
Gandi Bouygues 
Telecom 
EP.net 1 Webvisions  Starhub  EP.net 0 - 
Gandi 1 Gandi  Neotelecoms  LINX 1 
Gandi Bouygues 
Telecom 
IIJ NA NA 1 JMF  IIJ 
Infinitum 
Technologies 1 Infinitum  Level 3 1 
Infinitum  TW 
Telecom 
JMF NA NA 1 JMF  IIJ 
Level3 1 Infinitum  Level 3 0 - 
LINX 1 Gandi  Neotelecoms  LINX 0 - 
Neotelecoms 1 Gandi  Neotelecoms  LINX 0 - 
Starhub 1 Webvisions  Starhub  EP.net 1 
Infinitum  TW 
Telecom 
Telekom 
Malaysia 0 - 1 
Webvisions  Telekom 
Malaysia 
TW Telecom 0 - 1 Infinitum  TW Telecom 
Webvisions 1 Webvisions  Staruhub  EP.net 1 
Webvisions  Telekom 
Malaysia 
34 
1Since Akamai serves both HTML and images for Facebook in Japan, this column does not include the 
“with Akamai” delivery of HTML in Japan.  IIJ and JMF are not applicable as there is no Facebook 
content served without Akamai within Japan. 
 
Domains were again categorized as non-CDN and CDN assets depending on their use of Akamai.  
Since Facebook uses Akamai for HTML and image delivery in Japan, the France, Singapore, and 
U.S. non-CDN asset domains are classified as CDN assets within Japan. 
 
Non-CDN Assets 





























The login page and profile page bytes were categorized as non-CDN or CDN assets depending on 
the domain.  The average bytes per page view was then used to estimate the monthly 95/5 Gbps.   
 
Estimated Facebook Traffic 
Assets 







Average Standard Deviation Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Non-CDN 10,351 259 37,201 1,176 31,831 4,072,388 20.4-25.5 
CDN 182,886 4,326 418,749 14,836 371,576 48,658,159 243.3-304.1 
Japan CDN 10,351 259 37,201 1,176 31,831 93,665 0.5-0.6 
1The average bytes per page view assumes an average page weight equivalent to 20% of requests being for 
the login page, while the remaining 80% of requests being for profile pages. 
2The monthly GBs transferred assumes 140,607,281,658 page views based on Compete’s December 2009 
page view numbers.  Since Alexa indicates that Japan accounts for <2.3% of Facebook’s traffic, the 
calculations assume that 97.7% of the www.facebook.com and rand(11).channel10.facebook.com requests 
are non-CDN assets, while the remaining 2.3% are Japan CDN assets. 
3Lower range assumes 200,000 MBs transferred equals 1 Mbps measured at 95/5 while upper range 
assumes 160,000 MBs transferred equals 1 Mbps measured at 95/5. 
 
The overall Facebook traffic was then multiplied by the estimated country percentages to 










Facebook Country Traffic 
Country % of Site Traffic1 
95/5 Gbps 95/5 Gbps with 95% cache hit rate 
Non-CDN Assets CDN Assets Non-CDN Assets CDN Assets 
United States 29.7% 6.2-7.7 72.3-90.3 9.8-12.3 68.6-85.8 
Japan2 not available3 - 6.1-7.6 0.3-0.4 5.8-7.2 
France 4.9% 1.0-1.2 11.9-14.9 1.6-2.0 11.3-14.2 
Singapore not available 0.5-0.6 5.6-7.0 0.7-0.9 5.3-6.6 
1% of site traffic by country based on Alexa data. 
2The Japan country traffic accounts for the HTML and image delivery occurring through Akamai. 
3All countries whose % of site traffic is “not available” accounted for less than 2.3% of Facebook’s traffic.  
The 95/5 Gbps estimates are calculated assuming that these countries had 2.3% of Facebook’s traffic, the 
maximum possible amount. 
5.3 MySpace Analysis 
MySpace’s images are delivered by Akamai, while the HTML is served by MySpace’s origin 
server for end users within the United States.  MySpace appears to be using Akamai for image 
and HTML delivery in France, Japan, and Singapore.  However, end users receive images and 
HTML from different Akamai servers in these locations.  CDNs including Akamai will often 
customize the set of servers used for the delivery of certain content.  This customization allows 
the CDN to optimize the caching for sites with a large content footprint, deploy software to 
support proprietary protocols, and/or support the delivery of large files such as HD movies.  By 
serving the images and HTML from different servers, Akamai can support both MySpace’s 
multitude of small, static images and its frequently updated HTML.  Even though MySpace uses 
Akamai for both image and HTML delivery in these locations, the delivery from different 
Akamai servers also impacts the betweenness of networks.   
 
In the U.S., MySpace’s use of Akamai reduces the betweenness of Level 3 while increasing the 
betweenness of TW Telecom.  In France, Japan, and Singapore, MySpace’s Akamai configuration 
impacts the betweenness of the Amsterdam Internet Exchange, Bouygues Telecom, Neotelecoms, 
NTT, Telekom Malaysia, and TW Telecom.  However, Akamai’s greatest impact on these 
networks is in the traffic volumes.  MySpace’s home and product pages have ~5x the image bytes 
as HTML bytes, so Akamai serves ~5x the traffic along the CDN image path as it does along the 




Figure 9.  MySpace Betweenness Analysis 
 
The following chart illustrates Akamai’s impact on betweenness assuming each just-traceroute 






MySpace Betweenness Analysis 
Autonomous 
System 
HTML Delivery  
(Without Akamai in U.S.)1 
Image Delivery  
(With Akamai)2 
HTML Delivery (With Akamai 
in France, Japan, and 
Singapore) 3 






























 Level 3 1 
Infinitum  TW 
Telecom NA NA 
JMF NA NA 1 JMF  IIJ 1 JMF  IIJ  
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NTT 
Level 3 1 Infinitum 
 Level 3 0 - 
NA NA 






NTT NA NA 0 - 1 JMF  IIJ  NTT 





1 Webvisions  Starhub 
Telekom 






TW Telecom 0 - 1 Infinitum  TW Telecom NA NA 





1 Webvisions  Starhub 
1Since MySpace uses Akamai for HTML delivery in France, Japan and Singapore, this column reflects the 
AS path for HTML delivery without Akamai in the U.S. 
2This column reflects the AS path for image delivery through Akamai in all geographic locations. 
3This column reflects the AS path for HTML delivery through Akamai in France, Japan, and Singapore. 
 
 
Domains were once again categorized as non-CDN and CDN assets depending on their use of 
Akamai.  Since MySpace uses Akamai for HTML and image delivery in France, Japan, and 























Non-CDN Assets (U.S.) 
Domain Owner 
beacon.scorecardresearch.com 3rd party 
googleads.g.doubleclick.net 3rd party 
pagead2.googlesyndication.com 3rd party 
www.google-analytics.com 3rd party 
www.myspace.com MySpace 
browseusers.myspace.com MySpace 














CDN Assets  














content.yieldmanager.com 3rd party 
m1.2mdn.net 3rd party 






The login page and profile page bytes were categorized as non-CDN or CDN assets depending on 
the domain.  The average bytes per page view was then used to estimate the monthly 95/5 Gbps.   
 
Estimated MySpace Traffic 
Assets 















Non-CDN 40,587 1,253 58,217 24,210 54,745 2,090,617 10.5-13.1 




40,587 1,253 58,217 24,210 54,745 47,716 0.2-0.3 
1The average bytes per page view assumes an average page weight equivalent to 20% of requests being for 
the home page, while the remaining 80% of requests being for browse users pages. 
2The monthly GBs transferred assumes 39,613,465,675 page views based on Compete’s December 2009 
page view numbers.  Alexa indicates that France is 1.6% of MySpace’s traffic while Japan is 2.0% and 
Singapore is a maximum of 1.4%.  The calculations assume that 95.0% of the www.myspace.com and 
browseusers.myspace.com requests are non-CDN assets, while the remaining 5.0% are France, Japan and 
Singapore CDN assets.  Although these pages include 3rd party non-CDN content, it is assumed to be 
negligible and all non-CDN content becomes France, Japan and Singapore CDN assets. 
3Lower range assumes 200,000 MBs transferred equals 1 Mbps measured at 95/5 while upper range 
assumes 160,000 MBs transferred equals 1 Mbps measured at 95/5. 
 
The overall MySpace traffic was again multiplied by the estimated country percentage for the 





MySpace Country Traffic 
Country % of Site Traffic1 
95/5 Gbps 95/5 Gbps with 95% cache hit rate 
Non-CDN Assets CDN Assets Non-CDN Assets CDN Assets 
United States 58.6% 6.3-7.8 33.8-42.3 8.0-9.9 32.1-40.2 
Japan2 1.6% - 1.0-1.2 0-0.1 0.9-1.2 
France2 2.0% - 1.2-1.6 0.1 1.2-1.5 
Singapore2 not available3 - 0.9-1.1 0-0.1 0.8-1.0 
1% of site traffic by country based on Alexa data. 
2The France, Japan and Singapore country traffic accounts for the HTML and image delivery occurring 
through Akamai. 
3All countries whose % of site traffic is “not available” accounted for less than 1.4% of MySpace’s traffic.  
The 95/5 Gbps estimates are calculated assuming that these countries had 1.4% of MySpace’s traffic, the 
maximum possible amount. 
 
5.4 Akamai’s Impact on Backbone Provider Betweenness 
This empirical analysis illustrates the impact that overlay networks, such as Akamai, can have on 
a network’s betweenness.  In this example, Akamai impacts not only a network’s calculated 
betweenness metric, but also the volatility of the metric.   
5.4.1 Betweenness Impact 
By selecting the optimal Akamai server for each just-traceroute agent rather than relying only on 
the BGP path, Akamai has a significant impact on the betweenness of the network providers.  
Networks with Akamai servers, such as Bouygues Telecom, IIJ, Telekom Malaysia, and 
Webvisions, realize a dramatic increase in their betweenness metric.  In contrast, Level 3, which 
had the highest betweenness for origin HTML delivery, has a betweenness of 0 with Akamai.  
These betweenness calculations assume that the content is cached and served from the Akamai 
server.  Akamai requests updated content from the origin at intervals determined by the content 
owner.  The frequency and time sensitivity of content changes impact the Akamai cache hit rate 
and therefore the number of requests between the Akamai server and the origin.  Akamai traffic 
may not pass through Level 3 if there is a 100% cache hit rate, but origin content requests may 
traverse Level 3.  Even if content can be served stale from cache or there are alternate paths to the 
origin that exclude Level 3, Level 3 is not likely to be entirely avoidable.    
 
eBay, Facebook, and MySpace Betweenness Impact 
Autonomous 
System 
Without Akamai With Akamai 
Betweenness Sites Betweenness Sites 
AboveNet 1 eBay 0 - 
Amsterdam 









Deutsche Telecom 1 eBay 0 - 
EP.net 1 Facebook 0 - 
Gandi2 2 eBay, Facebook 33 eBay, Facebook, MySpace 
IIJ1 1 eBay 34 eBay, Facebook, MySpace 
Infinitum2 3 eBay, Facebook, MySpace 3 
eBay, Facebook, 
MySpace 
JMF2 1 eBay 34 eBay, Facebook, MySpace 
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Level 3 5 eBay, Facebook, MySpace 0 - 
LINX 1 Facebook 0 - 
Neotelecoms 1 Facebook 13 MySpace 
NTT1 0 - 13 MySpace 
Starhub1 2 eBay, Facebook 33 eBay, Facebook, MySpace 
Telekom Malaysia1 0 - 33 eBay, Facebook, MySpace 
TW Telecom1 0 - 3 eBay, Facebook, MySpace 
Webvisions2 2 eBay, Facebook 33 eBay, Facebook, MySpace 
1Akamai servers are located in this network and served eBay, Facebook, and/or MySpace content. 
2A just-traceroute agent is located in this network. 
3Since MySpace delivery in France and Singapore only occurs through Akamai, the network’s “with 
Akamai” betweenness will be at least one unit greater than its “without Akamai” betweenness. 
4Since Facebook and MySpace delivery in Japan only occurs through Akamai, the network’s “with 
Akamai” betweenness will be at least two units greater than its “without Akamai” betweenness. 
 
5.4.2 Betweenness Volatility 
Due to Akamai’s dynamic mapping, a network’s betweenness is also much more volatile than it 
would be without the presence of an overlay network.  Akamai proactively monitors the 
availability and performance of its servers and automatically maps requests based on current 
Internet conditions.  A network’s betweenness varies depending on whether it has Akamai servers 
deployed, if Akamai identifies those servers as optimal for delivery, and if the network resides on 
the selected path for origin content retrieval.  Akamai server deployments require agreements 
with the datacenter owners and are subject to standard customs and installation timeframes.  
Deployment changes therefore have less impact on betweenness volatility as compared to the 
selection of optimal delivery servers and origin content retrieval paths. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Akamai Impact on Betweenness 
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This volatility reduces the correlation between a network’s betweenness and its unavoidability.  
For example, on August 26, 2009, requests from the Singapore just-traceroute agent for 
Akamaized eBay, Facebook, and MySpace content flowed through 
WebvisionsSingtelTelekom Malaysia rather than WebvisionsStarhubTelekom 
Malaysia.  However, requests for the origin eBay and Facebook content continued to flow from 
WebvisionsStarhubTelekom Malaysia.   
 
Akamaized eBay Singapore Path Analysis 
Standard Akamai Path Akamai Path August 26, 2009 
IP Address Network IP Address Network 
203.142.24.254  Webvisions 203.142.24.254  Webvisions 
202.157.128.61  Webvisions 202.157.128.61  Webvisions 
203.116.9.193  StarHub 202.157.128.1  Webvisions 
203.118.3.163  StarHub 203.208.192.89  Singtel 
219.93.153.129  Telekom Malaysia 203.208.149.189 Singtel 
58.27.104.181  TMNet 203.208.186.26  Singtel 
210.187.129.156  TMNet 210.187.129.156  TMNet 
210.187.129.156  TMNet 210.187.129.156  TMNet 
219.94.9.6  TMNet 219.94.9.6 TMNet 
202.71.96.29  Telekom Malaysia 202.71.96.29  Telekom Malaysia 
202.75.32.233  Telekom Malaysia 202.75.32.233  Telekom Malaysia 
202.75.32.194  Telekom Malaysia 202.75.32.194  Telekom Malaysia 
202.157.186.33 Webvisions 202.157.186.33  Webvisions 
 
 
eBay Origin Singapore Path Analysis 
Standard Origin Path Origin Path August 26, 2009 
IP Address Network IP Address Network 
203.142.24.254 Webvisions 203.142.24.254 Webvisions 
202.157.128.61 Webvisions 202.157.128.61 Webvisions 
203.116.9.193 StarHub 203.116.9.193 StarHub 
203.118.3.226 StarHub 203.118.3.226 StarHub 
4.71.134.21 Level3 4.71.134.21 Level3 
4.69.144.244 Level3 4.69.144.116 Level3 
4.69.132.9 Level3 4.69.132.9 Level3 
4.69.134.238 Level3 4.69.134.234 Level3 
4.69.134.221 Level3 4.69.134.217 Level3 
4.69.132.58 Level3 4.69.132.58 Level3 
4.53.1.58 Level3 4.53.1.58 Level3 
66.135.214.176 eBay 66.135.214.176 eBay 
 
5.4.3 Updating Betweenness to Account for Overlay Networks 
Given the impact of overlay networks on unavoidability, betweenness should incorporate the 
actual traffic flow.  Ideally this metric would be based on traffic data that was consistently 
gathered over time.  In the absence of such data, one alternative is to examine the top trafficked 
Web sites in each country and categorize their content as CDN and non-CDN.  This 
categorization should be domain-specific as many sites use CDNs for a subset of their content.  
Both the origin path and the Akamai path should be considered when estimating betweenness.  
For example, Starhub’s and Singtel’s betweenness differs depending on whether the calculation 
considers both Akamai and origin delivery.  On August 26, 2009, Akamai’s mapping change 
reduced Starhub’s betweenness while increasing Singtel’s betweenness.  The networks’ 
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betweenness would remain unchanged on that day if it were calculated based only on origin 
content requests.  The following table provides sample betweenness calculations for Starhub and 
Singtel using only the Akamai path, only the origin path, and then considering both the Akamai 
and the origin paths.  By including the Akamai path and the origin path separately in the 
calculation, the betweenness metric better captures the unavoidability of the networks.  While 
Starhub appears unavoidable for origin requests, Akamai requests can be routed through Singtel 
as an alternative.   
 
Starhub and Singtel Betweenness Calculations 
Request Path Starhub Singtel Aug 25 Aug 26 Aug 27 Aug 25 Aug 26 Aug 27 
Akamai only 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Origin only 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Akamai and origin 2 1 2 0 1 0 
 
However, it is not sufficient to simply consider the Akamai and origin paths when calculating 
betweenness.  Due to the complexity of Akamai’s mapping, end users are not consistently 
mapped to the same server due to current Internet conditions and each Web site’s Akamai 
configuration.  Similarly, requests between the Akamai servers and the origin servers do not 
always follow the same AS path.  For example, MySpace uses Akamai for both image and HTML 
delivery in France, Singapore, and Japan, but Akamai serves the images and HTML from 
different sets of servers.  Even though the images and HTML are all served by Akamai, a 
network’s betweenness will vary depending on whether it is calculated based on image or HTML 
requests.  For example, on August 26, 2009, Akamai served the MySpace images through Singtel 
while continuing to serve the HTML from Starhub.  
 
MySpace HTML and Image Betweenness Calculations 
Autonomous System Betweenness HTML Delivery Image Delivery 
Amsterdam Internet Exchange 1 0 
Bouygues Telecom 0 1 
Gandi 1 1 
IIJ 1 1 
JMF 1 1 
Neotelecoms 1 0 
NTT 1 0 
Starhub 1 1 
Telekom Malaysia 0 1 
Webvisions 1 1 
 
In order to account for CDNs’ content-specific routing strategies, the CDN traffic flows must be 
examined at a more granular level than the top-level domain.   
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6. Access Network Market Power and Betweenness 
 
Concerns about network market power are not limited to those network providers at the top of the 
Internet hierarchy.  In recent years, the concerns have actually shifted from the backbone 
providers at the core of the Internet to the access networks at the edge.  Limited access network 
competition can not only impact consumer pricing or increase the likelihood of harmful 
discrimination, it can also lead to unfair interconnection practices.  Consumers can typically 
choose to purchase Internet access from either their incumbent telephone or cable provider.  The 
FCC has often considered whether both options exist, especially in rural areas, and whether the 
options offered by the incumbents truly create a competitive market.  Recent interconnection 
disputes have generated questions about whether the concentration in access networks also 
impacts the ability of other network providers to deliver traffic to those end users.  This concern 
is not restricted to interconnection between access networks and upstream networks.  Due to the 
emergence of “hyper giants” who are responsible for a large percentage of Internet traffic, this 
concern extends to the relationships between access networks and pure play CDNs as well as 
access networks and large content providers (Labovitz et al, 2009).   
   
It is difficult to quantify the betweenness of an access network as the betweenness definition 
focuses on those networks that lie on the shortest path between two networks.  This shortest path 
is not inclusive of the two network endpoints.  Even if the betweenness definition were extended 
so that an endpoint could be an end user, betweenness might still not be an accurate indicator of 
access network market power.  An access network will always lie on the shortest path between 
other networks and the end users who purchase Internet connectivity through it.  An access 
network market power metric must reflect the access network’s ability to engage in unfair 
competitive practices when other networks try to reach its end users.   
 
In order to identify the critical components of a market power metric for access networks, it is 
useful to understand the difference in how upstream providers or single network CDNs work with 
access networks and how pure play CDNs ensure they can deliver traffic to an access network.  
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 describe these situations respectively.  Pure play CDNs should have an 
advantage in that they can reach an access network’s end users by deploying either in the access 
network or in any network with an interconnection agreement with the access network.  If a CDN 
is able to find alternative options for delivering content to an access network’s end users, it is a 
variable that should be considered when assessing the market power of an access network.  
Section 6.3 provides an empirical example designed to ascertain whether a CDN does have 
alternative options for reaching an access network’s end users.  The example focuses on France as 
the French ISPs have publicly stated their intention to limit CDN access if they are not 
compensated according to their terms.  By analyzing the CDN traffic flows in France, we can 
determine the extent of the French ISPs’ ability to restrict access.  If a CDN is either unable to 
deliver content to an access network’s end users or is only able to deliver content to those users 
from its deployments within the access network, this may suggest that the access network is able 
to control access to its subscribers. 
6.1 Access Networks and Upstream Providers 
In December 2010, Comcast and Level 3 had a very public dispute regarding interconnection 
(Anderson, 2010).  Historically, Comcast had paid Level 3 for transit.  However, Level 3 also 
operates a CDN in addition to its Internet backbone.  Unlike an overlay CDN such as Akamai, 
Level 3’s CDN consists of servers deployed on its own network.  If a Comcast end user requests 
content from a customer of Level 3’s CDN services, the end user is mapped to a server on Level 
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3’s network.  Level 3 then serves the content to Comcast for delivery to the end user.  This traffic 
is classified as on-network.  Unlike off-network traffic, on-network requests do not travel 
upstream from Level 3’s network.  While Comcast paid Level 3 for off-network transit traffic, 
Comcast and Level 3 had a settlement-free peering relationship for this on-network traffic.   
 
During the fall of 2010, Level 3 signed a CDN deal with Netflix which dramatically increased the 
on-network traffic Level 3 would be delivering to Comcast.  Although exact traffic volumes were 
not disclosed, Sandvine has estimated that Netflix accounts for 20% of non-mobile Internet traffic 
(Abell, 2010; Sandvine, 2010) and Comcast indicated that the Level 3 to Comcast traffic ratio 
would increase from 2:1 to 5:1.  Comcast expressed concern about the new imbalance between 
the two companies’ traffic ratios and indicated that Level 3 should pay for the additional on-
network traffic.  Comcast reasoned that “[c]ontent delivery networks…are not Internet backbone 
providers.  Their business involves sending significantly more traffic that they receive.  For that 
reason they typically purchase services (“paid interconnection”) from Internet backbone providers 
(Waz and Charyton, 2010).”  Level 3’s response was that Comcast was exercising its power as a 
terminating access monopoly.   “This action by Comcast threatens the open Internet and is a clear 
abuse of the dominant control that Comcast exerts in broadband access markets as the nation’s 
largest cable provider…Comcast is preventing competing content from ever being delivered to 
Comcast’s subscribers at all, unless Comcast’s unilaterally-determined toll is paid – even though 
Comcast’s subscribers requested the content.  With this action, Comcast demonstrates the risk of 
a ‘closed’ Internet, where a retail broadband Internet access provider decides whether and how 




Figure 11.  Level 3 and Comcast Relationship 
 
This dispute contributed to interconnection concerns about whether control of access to end users 
also impacts a network’s market power.  Previously these access networks would have been 
classified near the bottom of the Internet hierarchy based on their betweenness and thus assumed 
to have limited market power.  However, the Comcast and Level 3disagreement suggests that a 
network’s control over access to end users might also impact its market power. 
 
6.2 Access Networks and CDNs 
The Comcast and Level 3 dispute concentrated on a traffic imbalance between an access network 
and an upstream network who also offers CDN services.  There have been other recent 
disagreements between network providers and pure play CDNs due to the provider’s perception 
that CDNs are monetizing over-the-top content without investing in the underlying infrastructure.  
Whereas networks may have previously offered free bandwidth to CDNs due to the resulting 
upstream bandwidth savings, networks are now requiring that CDNs pay for access, sometimes at 
above market rates.  However, an access network’s ability to “control” access to their end users 




Figure 12.  Akamai and Level 3 Deployment Options 
 
Since pure play CDNs do not own the underlying infrastructure, they have more alternatives for 
delivering content to an access network’s end users.  Network providers are often limited to 
establishing physical interconnection points with the access network.  Pure play CDNs can deploy 
servers either within the access network or within any network that has a relationship with the 
access network.  While they prefer to deploy servers directly in the access network for 
performance and cost reasons (at least historically), they can reach these end users by deploying 
servers in other networks that have a relationship with the access network.  For example, Level 3 
only deploys its CDN servers within its own network, so it must have a relationship with Comcast 
in order to deliver content to Comcast’s end users.  Pure play CDNs such as Akamai can deploy 
servers directly in Comcast or in another network such as Level 3 that has an interconnection 
agreement with Comcast.  While the access network may control access to its end users, the 
overlay network does not necessarily have to negotiate an agreement directly with the access 
network.   
 
In order to assess the viability of these alternative deployment strategies, we can focus on a 
market in which access networks have expressed their intention to charge overlay networks and 
content providers for access to their end users.   
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6.3 Empirical Example of CDN Interconnection Options 
This issue of access networks requesting increased payments from CDNs and content providers is 
perhaps most pronounced in France.  French network providers have been very vocal about 
foreign companies, such as Google, not contributing to infrastructure investments.  The French 
government has even proposed measures such as taxing Web sites’ online advertising revenues to 
insure that content providers are contributing to infrastructure investment (Lassar, 2011; Le 
Monde, 2011).  This issue has also surfaced in French network providers relationships with 
CDNs.  For example, several articles in early 2011 claimed that French ISPs had kicked Akamai 
out of France and were demanding additional payment in order to carry Akamai video traffic 
(Matsumoto, 2011; Powell, 2011).  France may therefore provide an interesting viewpoint into 
the extent to which an access network can control access to its end users. 
 
The objective of this analysis is to determine whether alternative deployment strategies exist for a 
pure play CDN in France.  This is achieved by examining how Akamai serves content to requests 
originating from each of the three major French ISPs.  If Akamai delivers content to an access 
network’s end users from other networks, this indicates that there are alternatives to deploying 
within that access network.  However, if Akamai only serves content from within an access 
network to its end users, this should not be interpreted as there being no other deployment options 
due to the various parameters considered in the request mapping.  In this analysis, a reduced 
ability to deliver content to an access network’s end users would be the only indication that 
alternative deployment options may not exist.  In a severe case, this reduced ability might result 
in timeouts or errors, but in most cases it would appear as performance degradation.   
 
The analysis involved identifying the DNS name servers associated with the three major French 
access networks, determining to which Akamai server the ISPs’ end users would be mapped 
when they request Akamaized content, and analyzing the network associated with those 
destination IPs.  The following DNS name servers were selected for the analysis: 
 
AS Number Network Name Server IP Address 
3215 France Telecom 194.51.3.49 194.51.3.65 






Requests were issued from each name server for Akamaized eBay, Facebook, and MySpace 
domains (pics.ebaystatic.com, static.ak.fbcdn.net and largeassets.myspacecdn.com) and the 
resulting Akamai server IP address was noted.  The results provide some visibility into Akamai 
deployments and mapping as well as the French ISPs’ interconnection agreements.  While some 
requests were mapped to Akamai servers in France Telecom, no requests were mapped to Akamai 
servers in Free or SFR.  While this confirms that Akamai has deployments within France 
Telecom, it does not definitively indicate a lack of Akamai deployments in Free and SFR.  For 
example, even though Akamai has servers in France Telecom, the France Telecom nameservers 
were not always mapped to those servers.  This off network mapping was likely due to network 
topology, current Internet conditions, cost considerations or other parameters incorporated into 
Akamai’s mapping decisions.  The analysis also demonstrates that Akamai does have alternative 
methods for serving end users on an access network regardless of whether or not Akamai has 
servers deployed within that access network.   
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Figures 13, 14, and 15 illustrate the Akamai deployments and the associated networks serving 
SFR, Free, and France Telecom end users respectively.  If an Akamai server is depicted within a 
network, requests were mapped to the Akamai servers in those networks.  The networks are 




Figure 13.  Akamai Deployments Serving SFR End Users 
 
SFR end users were mapped to Akamai servers deployed in KPN Telecom, the Reykjavik 
Internet Exchange, Cable and Wireless, Tinet, and TeliaSonera.  No requests were mapped to 
Akamai servers in SFR. 
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Figure 14.  Akamai Deployments Serving Free End Users 
 
Free end users were mapped to Akamai servers deployed in KPN Telecom, Init Seven, Deutsche 
Telecom, cable and Wireless, Tinet, and France Telecom.  No requests were mapped to Akamai 




Figure 15. Akamai Deployments Serving France Telecom End Users 
 
In addition to being mapped to Akamai servers deployed in France Telecom, France Telecom end 
users were mapped to Akamai servers deployed in KPN Telecom, TeliaSonera, Deutsche 
Telecom, Cable and Wireless, Tinet, GIP Renator, and Numericable.  Overall, requests for 
Akamaized content were served from Akamai deployments in multiple networks.  This appears to 
indicate that there are a variety of alternative interconnection options available for Akamai in 
France. 
 
This analysis suggests that the availability of alternative access options should be considered 
when assessing access network market power.  These alternative options, along with the 
previously expressed concerns about relying on BGP data for such metrics and the inapplicability 
of the existing betweenness definition, suggest the need for a new metric for assessing access 
network market power.  Section 7 presents some recommendations including the consideration of 
an access network’s access variance and its market relevance.  Access variance is a new 
parameter that is first being proposed in this thesis.  It is intended to capture the available 
alternatives for reaching an access network’s end users.  While this thesis does not develop all 
dimensions of access variance, Section 7 provides guidance regarding the characteristics and 
measurement options for assessing access variance.   
 
51 
7. Access Network Market Power Recommendations 
 
As noted in Section 6, the current betweenness definition does not result in a meaningful metric 
for access networks as access networks do not reside on the shortest path between two networks.  
Even if betweenness were adjusted to be inclusive of the end points, it would not capture the 
nuances of access network market power as the access network would always reside on the 
shortest path.  The analysis in Section 6 demonstrates that there may be viable alternatives to 
establishing a direct relationship with an access network.  A metric designed to assess access 
network market power should capture the ability of network providers and overlay networks to 
establish alternative interconnection agreements that allow for delivery to the access network’s 
end users.  These agreements would be with providers other than the access network.  Such a 
metric should also consider an access network’s market share within the relevant market.  As with 
all situations regarding market power, the relevant market must be carefully defined.  Its 
definition must account for the other network’s or CDN’s objectives in establishing a relationship 
with the access network.  For example, CDNs are concerned about ensuring high performance in 
those geographies in which content providers have end users. A CDN will be much more 
concerned about an access network that has 6% of the U.S. population as its subscribers as 
compared with an access network that has 85% of the Malaysian population.  While the 
populations may be of similar size, most CDNs have more content provider customers that are 
targeting the U.S. population and therefore place a higher value on the U.S. end users.8 
 
With access networks, the concern is that they will charge other network providers above market 
rates to deliver traffic to their end users.  A metric designed to assess access network market 
power therefore needs to consider both the diversity of feasible paths into the access network and 
the network’s market relevance.  Section 7.1 discusses the considerations in determining the 
diversity of feasible paths into an access network.  This aspect of an access network’s market 
power is introduced in this thesis and is referred to as access variance.  Section 7.2 then addresses 
assessing the access network’s market share or market relevance.   
7.1 Access Variance 
The concern about access network market power is related to the network’s ability to control 
access to its end users.  A metric used to assess access network market power should consider the 
variance in how content is delivered to that access network.  For example, the variance in the 
network immediately preceding the access network in the shortest path could be used to assess an 
access network’s market power when negotiating with other networks.  If an access network only 
has agreements with one or two upstream providers, this could indicate that the access network is 
restricting access to its end users.  Access variance is especially relevant when considering CDNs.  
CDNs effectively select the source address for the content through their mapping algorithms.  
Since the selections occur dynamically in real-time, the impact on a network’s unavoidability 
cannot be derived from the routing tables.  The distribution of requests across a CDN’s 
deployments destined for that access network could be used to evaluate an access network’s 
interactions with CDNs.  This access variance could help ascertain the diversity of access 
methods other than establishing an interconnection agreement directly with the access network. 
 
Access variance must also account for the viability of these other interconnection options.  An 
access network may establish interconnection agreements with a multitude of providers, but could 
implement routing policies or underprovision routers or bandwidth.  These actions could render 
                                                   
8
 According to Internet World Stats (www.internetworldstats), the U.S. had 245 million Internet subscribers 
and Malaysia had 17.7 million Internet subscribers at the end of 2011. 
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certain paths unusable in reality due to congestion and poor performance.  One challenge is 
determining whether the various paths are actually feasible especially as congestion levels may 
vary.  Traffic monitoring tools such as MRTG (Multi Router Traffic Grapher) could provide 
partial visibility into traffic levels, but would require that each network implements such a 
program and makes the results accessible to policymakers.  While this thesis does not develop all 
of the dimensions of access variance, the following chart outlines additional parameters that 
could be used to assess the variability of alternative paths. 
 
Access Variance: Assessing Viability of Alternative Paths 
Characteristic Description Potential Source 
Network type (3G, 4G, 
broadband) 
The network type will help establish baseline 
expectations for congestion and performance 
(e.g. mobile networks will have different 
characteristics than fixed line networks). 
Network provider 
(bandwidth delay product) 
Provisioned capacity 
by link 
This will determine the total available 
capacity at various interconnection points. 
Network provider 
Traffic volume Traffic volumes will indicate the utilization 
of available capacity.  This will help identify 
if a link is consistently highly utilized and the 
network provider has not upgraded capacity 
in a reasonable timeframe. 
MRTG 
Packet loss The level of acceptable packet loss will differ 
depending on the type of traffic. 
Pingroute, Traceping 
Traffic profile  The traffic profile will consist of a 
breakdown of traffic by content category 
(video, ecommerce, etc).  It will help 
determine whether network performance is 
reasonable given the traffic profile. 
Deep Packet Inspection 
 
 
Given the challenges of assessing the viability of alternative options, access variance could be 
analyzed in two phases.  In the initial phase, policymakers could determine the overall diversity 
of paths into an access network.  If the number of available paths were limited, policymakers 
could examine the access network’s requirements for establishing interconnection agreements.  If 
the number of available paths appeared reasonable, policymakers would focus on the feasibility 
of those available paths.   
 
While it may be difficult to quantify the feasibility of alternative interconnection options, it is 
possible to begin developing a perspective of the diversity of the options.  For example, the 
diversity aspect of access variance could be determined for France Telecom, Free and SFR based 
on how requests were distributed to Akamai servers.  Akamai served end users in France 
Telecom, Free and SFR from 8, 6, and 5 different networks respectively.  The analysis also 
begins to reveal the viability of these alternative paths as no network accounted for more than 
38%, 43% or 35% of the total requests.  In order to fully analyze these networks, policymakers 
would need guidelines regarding an access network’s typical number of upstream relationships 








Percentage of Requests by Network 
Network France Telecom Free SFR 
1 38% 43% 35% 
2 18% 19% 26% 
3 15% 12% 21% 
4 10% 12% 13% 
5 10% 10% 5% 
6 5% 5% - 
7 3% - - 




Figure 16.  Akamai Mapping Distribution in France 
7.1.1 Access Variance Enhancements 
A further enhancement to the CDN access variance would be to analyze the performance impact 
when requests are directed off network.  This addition would help assess the viability of 
alternative interconnection strategies.  For example, France Telecom users might experience 
similar performance when receiving content from Akamai servers deployed in France Telecom as 
they do when receiving content from Akamai servers deployed in TeliaSonera.  France Telecom’s 
access variance should therefore be adjusted to reflect those alternative interconnection options 
that introduce minimal additional latency compared to on-network delivery.  The performance 
could be estimated by determining the number of networks in the shortest path between the 
Akamai server and the end user and comparing that to the shortest path between the origin and 
the end user.  However, as noted in Section 4.2, the shortest path is not necessarily equivalent to 
the best performance, so live traffic measurements are preferable.   
 
7.2 Market Relevance 
Interconnection concerns regarding backbone provider market power focus on a network’s ability 
to impact another provider’s access to the rest of the Internet.  With access networks, the concern 
is over the network controlling access to its own end users.  A market power metric applied to 
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access networks must incorporate the relevance of the access network’s market.  This includes the 
access network’s market share as well as how relevant this market is for the upstream provider or 
CDN trying to gain access.  For example, France Telecom has 49% market share within the 
France DSL market (Benkler, 2010, p. 269).  However, there are 51 million Internet users in 
France which is only 2.5% of the overall Internet user population (www.internetworldstats.com).  
If all 51 million users were included in France’s DSL market, France Telecom would have 24.9 
million users, or 1.2% of the Internet user population.  While establishing a relationship with 
France Telecom may be critical within France, its importance is greatly reduced for a CDN 
concerned about delivering content to users globally. 
 
The market share of the access network could be estimated using a modified version of 
D’Iganzio’s and Giovannetti’s customer cone.  Given the prevalence of network address 
translation (NATs) and other techniques, the customer cone should not be based entirely on 
number of allocated IP addresses.  While the IP space is one parameter, the customer cone could 
also incorporate the network’s number of subscribers and the volume of traffic delivered to that 
network.  The relevance of the access network will depend on the intentions of the upstream 





Recent events, such as concerns about network neutrality and the disagreement between Level 3 
and Comcast, have raised questions about whether the government should regulate Internet 
interconnection.  In order to assess the need for government intervention, policymakers must have 
a mechanism for quantifying network market power.  In the past, policymakers have relied on 
data points such as a network provider’s revenue, points of presence, and number of advertised IP 
addresses.  While these metrics are helpful in beginning to assess network market share and 
market power, there is a recognized need that more sophisticated metrics are required.  D’Ignazio 
and Giovannetti proposed two metrics, customer cone and betweenness, that use BGP data and 
inferred interconnection agreements to estimate a network’s market power.   
 
As discussed throughout this thesis, the relevance and accuracy of betweenness as a proxy for 
market power depends on whether it is being applied to backbone providers or access networks.  
With some modifications, betweenness can serve as a proxy for assessing market concentration 
when evaluating backbone providers.  These modifications include accounting for the impact of 
overlay networks, such as CDNs, on a network’s betweenness.  However, since access networks 
are outside the definition of betweenness, a new metric is proposed that accounts for access 
variance and market relevance.  These recommended adjustments highlight the careful 
consideration required when defining the market for both backbone providers and access 
networks. 
 
8.1 Backbone Providers and Betweenness 
The concern with backbone providers is that other networks cannot exchange traffic with a 
significant portion of the Internet without interconnecting with that provider.  The existing 
betweenness definition is intended to capture the degree of a network’s unavoidability in reaching 
the rest of the Internet.  If a network resides on a relatively large number of shortest paths, the 
assumption is that it becomes more critical for other providers to interconnect with that provider.  
Betweenness is therefore a relevant metric for assessing the market power of backbone providers.  
However, the growth of overlay networks such as CDNs creates challenges when relying on BGP 
data to calculate betweenness.  As documented in Sections 4 and 5, overlay networks do not alter 
the advertised BGP routes, but impact the flow of the actual traffic.  The result is that BGP data is 
not indicative of the actual request flow and does not represent the true unavoidability of a 
network.  The unavoidability of a network depends on its and others’ interconnection agreements 
with other network providers and overlay networks.   
 
Betweenness should incorporate the actual traffic flow rather than relying solely on BGP data.  
One challenge of incorporating traffic flow is the volatility introduced by CDNs.  A network 
provider will expand its footprint through infrastructure investments or mergers and acquisitions.  
Any impact on interconnection agreements and BGP routes will have a fairly long timescale.  In 
contrast, CDNs and their content provider customers can implement changes that have a much 
shorter timescale.  Since pure play CDNs deploy servers in existing datacenters and dynamically 
distribute traffic across their servers, the presence of a CDN will not have a consistent impact on 
betweenness across or even within geographies.  Additionally, content providers may elect to 
only use a CDN for certain content types or may frequently change their CDN use due to cost or 
other considerations.  All of these actions can significantly impact the unavoidability of a 
network.  In order to account for the variance, a network’s betweenness should be calculated at 
regular intervals using a combination of BGP data and actual traffic flows.  The traffic flow data 
56 
should include requests for different content types (e.g., HTML, images) from several of the top 
Web sites. 
 
8.2 Access Networks, Access Variance and Market Relevance 
Since betweenness is not applicable to access networks, a new metric is required when assessing 
access network market power.  This metric should consider the access network’s access variance 
and market relevance.  Access variance is a new concept introduced in this thesis.  It addresses 
the available alternatives for reaching an access network’s end users, such as establishing an 
interconnection relationship or deploying CDN servers in an upstream provider.  The definition of 
access variance should vary depending on whether the concern is an access network’s 
relationship with an upstream provider or with a CDN.  When focusing on an access network’s 
relationship with upstream providers, access variance could be determined by the number of 
upstream interconnection agreements.  When considering an access network’s relationship with 
CDNs, access variance could be determined by the distribution of requests across a CDN’s 
deployments.  Market relevance will incorporate the relevance of that access network from the 
other network’s or CDN’s perspective. 
 
Network providers may be able to impact their access variance on a much shorter timescale than 
that required to affect market power metrics in other industries.  There is usually at least one 
aspect of these metrics that is under the control of the entity to which they apply.  For example, 
telecommunications companies can introduce incentives to increase (or decrease) their number of 
subscribers.  However, network providers may be able to influence their access variance more 
significantly.  Network providers could quickly establish new interconnection agreements or 
adjust their routing policies to enhance the viability of existing paths.  Similar to how CDN 
deployment and mapping decisions impact the volatility of betweenness, network providers will 
likely have much more control over this measure of their market power than in other industries. 
 
8.3 Market Definition Considerations 
One of the persistent challenges in assessing market power is defining the appropriate market.  
There is no definitive approach for defining the market, but economists agree that substitution 
possibilities must be taken into account.  As George Stigler stated, “[a]n industry should embrace 
the maximum geographical area and the maximum variety of productive activities in which there 
is a strong long-run substitution (Viscusi et al, 1995, p. 156).”  Network market power 
assessments typically define the market as the entire Internet and view other network providers as 
offering substitutive products.  Based on the previous analysis, both aspects of the network 
market definition should be refined when assessing both backbone providers and access 
networks. 
8.3.1 Geographic Scope 
A network provider’s market power will vary greatly with geographic scope.  When assessing the 
market power of a backbone provider, their role in the overall Internet hierarchy is still important.  
When evaluating the market power of an access network, their role in the local Internet hierarchy 
is critical.  A network may be the dominant provider within a country, but it may not be classified 
as an Internet backbone provider based on betweenness.  For example, Telekom Malaysia has 
>80% market share in Malaysia based on number of subscribers, but is not classified as a Tier 1 
backbone provider.  If Telekom Malaysia’s market power as a backbone provider is being 
evaluated, Telekom Malaysia’s role in the overall Internet hierarchy should be considered.  Other 
network providers in Southeast Asia are not dependent on having an interconnection agreement 
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with Telekom Malaysia in order to gain access to and from the rest of the Internet.  In contrast, 
Telekom Malaysia provides access to >80% of the end users in Malaysia.  Network providers 
must have an interconnection agreement with Telekom Malaysia or another network that has an 
agreement with Telekom Malaysia in order to deliver traffic to those end users.  Telekom 
Malaysia has greater market power as an access network than as a backbone provider because 
there are much few options for long-run substitution.  However, a global CDN may place 
minimal importance on Malaysia given the interests of their content provider customers.  The 
geographic scope and market relevance must be carefully assessed when examining network 
market power.     
8.3.2 Involved Entities 
The growth and impact of overlay networks suggests that the entities impacting substitution 
possibilities should be expanded beyond network providers.  The previous sections have 
illustrated the effect that overlay networks, especially CDNs, can have on a network’s 
betweenness.  However, this analysis does not capture the full impact of overlays on 
interconnection.  Overlays can also affect a network’s transit requirements, increasing its 
attractiveness to subscribers through better performance and lower costs and making it newly 
eligible for peering relationships.  While these factors are not captured in the current definition of 
betweenness, they impact a network’s market power and market size.  For example, by deploying 
Akamai servers, access ISPs that offer connectivity to end users can reduce their upstream 
bandwidth requirements.  These lower transit costs could allow the access ISPs to offer more 
attractive prices to consumers thereby attracting more subscribers.  The reduction in upstream 
bandwidth can also impact a network’s peering eligibility.  In order to be eligible for a peering 
arrangement, networks must typically meet certain pre-qualifications including maintaining 
specified traffic ratios.  For example, AT&T requires that a new peer must have “[n]o more than a 
2:1 ratio of traffic into AT&T: out of AT&T, on average each month (AT&T, 2011).”  Since 
Akamai serves popular content from within the network in which the servers are deployed, the 
network wishing to peer with AT&T could reduce the amount of upstream traffic being served 
from AT&T into its network.   
 
Overlays can have a significant impact on interconnection within a country even if they are only 
used by a few popular Web sites.  For example, based on the analysis in Section 5, Akamai would 
be serving 8.1-10.1 Gbps in Japan just by delivering eBay, MySpace, and Facebook content.  
Since Japan’s overall broadband subscriber traffic is estimated to be 800 Gbps (Japan, 2008), the 
Akamai traffic from eBay, MySpace, and Facebook is 1.0%-1.3% of the overall traffic.  If only a 
subset of the networks in a country elect to deploy overlay network infrastructure, this can shift 
the traffic patterns.  Networks with overlay infrastructure might enhance their negotiating 






Overlays also impact other factors that can indicate the level of competitiveness in the market.  
For example, entry conditions consider the ease with which new entry can take place.  As noted 
in Economics of Regulation and AntiTrust, a “[c]redible threat of entry will induce active firms to 
compete vigorously.  If they do not, so that the industry has a high price-cost margin, entry will 
take place and drive price down (Viscusi et al, 1995, p. 165).”  As noted in Section 6.2.2, CDNs 
may impact the ease of entry of competitors.  Since CDNs can reduce a network’s upstream 
traffic and increase the likelihood of peering eligibility, CDNs may provide a less expensive 
alternative for new entrants to gain market share.  For example, Bouygues Telecom is a recent 
entry in the French Internet access market, but they have been able to capture <1% of the market 
(Benkler, 2010).  While they still have minimal market share, they have been able to attain this 
market share even with the dominance of France Telecom.  Their entry has also created a price 
war, leading to more competitive pricing for consumers (Rasmussen, 2011).     
 
The growth of overlays and their impact on interconnection also raises questions about whether 
their market power should be evaluated when considering interconnection regulation.  However, 
the inclusion of overlay networks would necessitate the creation of new metrics.  For example, 
betweenness may not be a relevant metric for evaluating the market power of CDNs.  Akamai 
would have a high betweenness, yet Akamai is only unavoidable if the content providers maintain 
their CNAME directing DNS requests to the Akamai infrastructure.   
 
8.4 Further Research 
There is a significant amount of research that could be undertaken to help quantify network 
market power.  In addition to refining betweenness as suggested in previous sections, researchers 
should evaluate external indicators.  These indicators could include the number of depeering 
incidents, publicly available data on bandwidth prices, the range of interconnection agreements, 
and evidence that networks are degrading certain access methods.  These could provide early 
signs that the market power of a network or networks is resulting in anti-competitive practices. 
 
One of the most critical areas of research is regarding the development of appropriate metrics for 
assessing access network market power.  This thesis proposes the creation of a new metric that 
incorporates an access network’s access variance and market relevance.  The access variance 
variable needs to account for the size of the population over which the requests are distributed as 
well as the distribution pattern.  In order to determine whether a network’s parameters are 
reasonable, there must be a baseline against which to compare.  This baseline should include data 
on the typical number of upstream providers, the distribution of requests across providers, and the 
best mechanisms for assessing the viability of path options.  Similar research is required to 
determine the criteria for gauging that a market is deemed relevant from the perspective of the 
upstream provider or CDN.  Finally, the comparative influence of access variance and market 
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